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This thesis argues that throughout the twentieth century, the Orthodox Church in America 
contemplated whether to turn inward and defend Orthodoxy from American and earthly influence 
or compromise with outside influences in order to spread the faith across the continent. Its 
commitment to preserve Orthodoxy from secularism led to periods of isolation after the Russian 
Revolution, but postwar ecumenism and liturgical revival led clergy to reclaim evangelism as a 
means to bringing others into the true church and combatting secularism. Nonetheless, the failure 
of ecumenism to convert the non-Orthodox complicated this narrative, leading parish priests and 
laity to pursue social conservatism to combat secularism. The first chapter will situate the OCA 
within the Russian Revolution, explaining the theological and social motivations for declaring 
autocephaly and separating from the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. The second chapter 
examines the OCA’s ecumenical relationships with Catholics and liberal Protestants as the OCA 
explored ecumenism as a means to spread Orthodoxy and stop the spread of secularism. The final 
chapter examines the OCA in the context of the rise of the Christian Right, arguing that while high 
clergy remained committed to ecumenism, some priests and laity viewed social conservatism as a 
better solution to secularism. In more recent years, the OCA has changed its relationship with 
American society and outside influence as laity and clergy become more involved in Orthodox 
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 In an interview with Katerina Fomenkov, the tension between East and West became clear.1  
She had spent her youth outside the Orthodox Church – the church of her Russian grandparents. 
Instead of divine truths, Katerina pursued professional success. However, after getting a job in 
Silicon Valley, she found herself unsatisfied: “I felt empty . . . . I was disconnected from anything 
bigger.”2 Fomenkov did not know what she was missing, but she started looking for answers. She 
started reading and listening to philosophers and public intellectuals like Jordan Peterson and 
Stefan Molyneux.3 While their critiques of Western society resonated with Fomenkov, she still felt 
unsatisfied. “They were just men,” she explained, “They had limited authority.”4 In 2019, after her 
father persuaded her, she attended an Orthodox Church service. There, she found the “solemn” 
and “sacred” truths that had alluded her outside the Church – the truths that the West “could not 
capture.”5  
Fomenkov’s story presents the Eastern Orthodox Church as a stable source of truth in the 
West; in reality, the Church has struggled to bring their ancient faith into the New World. In 1961, 
a year before becoming dean of St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary, Alexander Schmemann 
wrote an essay titled “The Missionary Imperative in the Orthodox Tradition” to counter the West’s 
notion that the “Eastern Orthodox Church” is a “non-missionary church.”6 Rather, it has a rich 
history of converting nonbelievers - particularly through the Russian Orthodox Church’s missions 
                                                 
1 Name has been changed to protect the subject’s privacy. 
2 Katerina Fomenkov (American Orthodox Christian) in conversation with the author, July 16, 2020.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Katerina Fomenkov (American Orthodox Christian) in conversation with the author, September 17, 2020.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Alexander Schmemann, “The Missionary Imperative in the Orthodox Tradition,” in Theology of the Christian 
Mission, ed. Gerald H. Anderson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 250. 
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converting Muslims in the Central Asian steppe.7 What is interesting about this article is not its 
message, but its audience. Schmemann wrote the article for the “Christian West” to dispel its 
misconceptions of Eastern Orthodoxy.8 In this case, he demonstrated that Eastern Orthodox 
missions were as “impressive and important” as Western ones.9 However, Schmemann believed 
that the West’s misconceptions of Eastern Orthodoxy extended beyond lacking knowledge of its 
history. As he explains, the West’s misunderstanding of Eastern Orthodox missions is a symptom 
of a broader problem: “the questions [Western Christians] asked [about Orthodoxy] were 
formulated in Western terms, were conditioned very often by specifically Western experience and 
developments.”10 Eastern and Western Christians lack a shared language of belief. Western 
Christians could not understand Orthodoxy, and when they tried, they reduced it to Western ideas. 
Worse yet, because of their schism from Orthodoxy, Westerners were vulnerable to secularism – 
which Schmemann defined as “being [and thinking] without God.”11  
 The West’s misunderstanding of Orthodoxy was a problem many clergy in the United 
States faced during the twentieth century. Schmemann and most Orthodox clergy who came to 
America were Russian emigres – or descendants of Russian emigres – who fled Russia after the 
Bolsheviks won the Russian Civil War.12 Some settled in Europe and others in the Middle East, 
but many traveled to North America – where the Russian Orthodox Church had conducted 
missions since the Russian Empire occupied Alaska in 1794. By the early twentieth century, the 
mission had expanded into the mainland United States; however, despite its centuries-long 
presence, Orthodoxy was not a dominant religion on the continent. It was not until 1930 that 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid, 251.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid, 252.  
11 Alexander Schmemann, Church, World, Mission (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1979), 3.  
12 S. A. Smith, Russia in Revolution: An Empire in Crisis, 1890-1928 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 228. 
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Orthodoxy had more than 100,00 adherents in the United States due to the conversions of 
Carpartho-Rusyn immigrants in Minneapolis, Minnesota led by Russian Orthodox Church leader 
Alexis Toth.13   
 The Orthodox clergy who arrived in the United States in the twentieth century found a 
church in crisis. The Bolshevik revolution had cut off its funding from the Russian monarchy and 
prevented the Russian Orthodox Church from communicating with its North American diocese – 
undermining the Church hierarchy.14 Without a connection to Moscow, North American parishes 
stopped receiving clergy trained in Orthodox seminaries. It seemed like Orthodoxy would 
disappear from North America. The United States had some Orthodox seminaries to train clergy, 
but these closed due to lack of funding.15 As American parishes failed to replenish their clergy 
with young priests, the Bolsheviks continued to starve its finances. To support the church, 
Orthodox clergy sold church property; however, the Bolsheviks seized some of the Church’s most 
expensive assets, such as St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York City, because they belonged to the 
Russian government.16  
As the Church stabilized by raising funds among clergy and suing to protect its property, 
it faced non-Orthodox neighbors who were ambivalent towards Orthodoxy. On one hand, 
American Protestants became sympathetic towards Orthodox Christians. In a 1919 Moody Monthly 
article titled, “Russia, the New Mission Field,” the author lamented the Orthodox Christians who 
find themselves persecuted by “the secular power . . . Bolshevik mob rule.”17 They became the 
                                                 
13 D. Oliver Herbel, Turning to Tradition: Converts and the Making of an American Orthodox Church (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 28.  
14 Gregory Afonsky, A History of the Orthodox Church in Alaska, 1794-1917 (Kodiak: St. Herman’s Theological 
Seminary), 95. 
15 Ibid.  
16 “Prayer on the Street Stills church Row: Factions in St. Nicholas Cathedral were on Point of Clash,” Baltimore 
Sun, July 27, 1925. 
17 Mich. A. de Sherbinin, “Russia, the New Mission Field,” Moody Monthly 20, no. 1 (1919): 293 
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martyrs of Christianity in fundamentalist magazines. However, descriptions of Orthodox 
Christians never discussed Orthodoxy, its institutions, traditions, or liturgy. An article published 
in 1923 by Moody Monthly argues that the “Word of God” will “save the soul of suffering Russia” 
through Protestant evangelism and airlifts of Bibles.18 This approach to saving Orthodox Christians 
fit the Protestant idea of sola scriptura – Scripture contains everything one needs to know to obtain 
salvation and live in accordance to God. This idea disregarded the desires of contemporary 
Orthodox Christians who wanted to remove Russian Orthodox Church from Soviet control and 
allow members to practice and perform liturgy freely, which the Orthodox understand as fulfilling 
the Word of God. Protestantism had no room for restoring Orthodox tradition and church 
institutions. As Schmeman wrote, Eastern Orthodox Christians faced a “Christian world with 
several centuries of ‘autonomous’ theological and spiritual development  . . .  with a mind and 
thought-forms radically different from those of the East.”19  
This thesis is a study of Orthodoxy in North America during the twentieth century, the 
experiences of clergy and members of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and their efforts to spread 
Orthodoxy across the continent. In particular, it focuses on the experiences of Orthodox Christians 
within the Orthodox Church in America (OCA), their reflections on Orthodoxy’s position in North 
America, understandings of non-Orthodox Christian traditions, and efforts to evangelize non-
Orthodox Christians. In doing so, this thesis examines Orthodoxy how interacted with other 
religious traditions and its commitment to evangelism. 
Furthermore, this thesis asks how OCA clergy and laity understood Orthodoxy’s position 
within America’s religious landscape, particularly its historical, theological, and cultural 
                                                 
18 S. H. Kirkbride, “The Ol’ Clo’ Man,” Moody Monthly 24, no. 2 (1923): 63.  
19 Schmemann, “The Missionary Imperative in the Orthodox Tradition,” 252. 
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differences with Western Christian traditions. In other words, this thesis asks how the OCA 
interacted with non-Orthodox Christians and whether the OCA formed relationships with these 
religious groups. It also asks how the OCA negotiated these boundaries to spread Orthodoxy to 
non-Orthodox Christians. To these ends, the questions this thesis asks include: How did the OCA 
understand its position in America? With which religious groups did the OCA form relationships? 
What prevented the OCA from forming relationships with other religious groups? Were these 
relationships to evangelize the non-Orthodox, or did they serve another purpose? 
For the most part, these questions are new in research on Orthodoxy in North America – 
although some previous researchers have partially dealt with these topics. Timothy B. Clemmen’s 
Marginalized Voices: A History of the Charismatic Movement in the Orthodox Church in North 
America, 1972-1993 shares this essay’s purpose: to dispel the narrative that Orthodoxy remains 
isolated from American religious trends – a myth propagated by the Orthodox Church hierarchy 
that contends that since Orthodoxy is the “one, holy, catholic, and apostolic” church, it must ignore 
outside influence to guard its sacred truths.20 While his broad goal is similar to mine, his research 
differs in scope and focus, as Clemmen’s focuses on the Charismatic Revival and covers Orthodox 
groups besides the OCA. Additionally, Amy Slagle’s The Eastern Church in the Spiritual Market 
Place: American Conversions to Orthodox Christianity examines why Americans convert to 
Orthodoxy.21 In that way, it reflects on Americans’ attitudes towards Orthodoxy. However, 
Slagle’s work situates Orthodoxy among those who found it appealing enough to convert. While 
converts’ voices are important in the story of North American Orthodoxy, providing a 
                                                 
20 Timothy B Clemmens, Marginalized Voices: A History of the Charismatic Movement in the Orthodox Church: 
1972-1993 (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2018), xi.  
21 Amy Slagle, The Eastern Orthodox Church in the Spiritual Marketplace: American Conversions to Orthodox 
Christianity (Dekalb: North Illinois University Press, 2011), 13. 
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comprehensive discussion on the OCA’s position within America’s religious landscape requires 
the voices of those who remained outside it.  
Other authors have written about Orthodoxy in an American context from a historical 
perspective, but they have focused on Orthodoxy’s ethnic dimensions. For example, John Erickson 
discusses how Orthodox immigrants’ relations reflected those of Old World politics.22 Mark Noll 
echoes his focus, although he hints at the evangelistic goals of the OCA.23 Recent work on 
Orthodoxy, such as John Anthony McGuckin’s The Eastern Orthodox Church: A New History has 
adjusted the historiography by situating North American Orthodoxy within the Eastern Orthodox 
Church. However, his book serves more as an introduction to Eastern Orthodoxy, its history, and 
its theology rather than a critical evaluation of Orthodox identity.  
The OCA deserves special attention because this church has had an experience unique 
among the Eastern Orthodox community. The OCA began as a Russian Orthodox diocese 
disconnected from its mother church after the Russian Revolution. While other Orthodox 
communities remained connected to their Old World patriarchates, the OCA’s predecessors 
experienced a crisis of ecclesiastical authority. To resolve it, they had to reconcile their isolation 
from Moscow and justify autocephaly while following ecclesiastical precedent enough to remain 
in good standing with other Orthodox Churches. The journey to autocephaly makes the OCA 
unique among American Orthodox communities and reveals how Orthodox Christians have dealt 
with crises of authority while maintaining their claim to apostolic succession. Second, during the 
latter half of the twentieth century, OCA scholars produced a lot of scholarship on Orthodoxy in 
English. These works made Orthodoxy accessible to an American audience, but more importantly, 
                                                 
22 John Erickson, Orthodox Christians in America: A Short History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 18. 
23 Mark Noll, A History of Christianity in the United States and America (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1992), 348.  
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they recorded OCA academic discourse. The OCA scholars created a narrative of its history that 
reflected its evangelistic mission. The OCA was continuing that the work of the Russian Orthodox 
Church began in Alaska: bringing Orthodoxy to the New World.  
To answer the questions in this introduction, this paper uses many primary sources. Sources 
cited early in the paper are mostly minutes from annual North American Orthodox councils (which 
the clergy called sobors). The thesis also supplements these minutes with coverage from local 
newspapers. Additionally, the first chapter uses contemporary newspapers and Christian 
magazines to outline non-Orthodox American Christians’ opinions of Orthodoxy and its followers. 
Most of the sources cited in chapters two and three are articles from St. Vladimir’s Theological 
Quarterly¸ an OCA publication featuring the writings of OCA clergy. Although the quarterly 
featured many authors, this thesis focuses on the articles written by notable Orthodox authors – 
especially deans of St. Vladimir’s seminary such as Alexander Schmemann, John Meyendorf, and 
Thomas Hopko – due to their influence and status within the OCA. These authors’ writings 
illustrate the changes in the OCA over the course of the second half of the twentieth century. While 
Schmemann was dean during the mid-twentieth century, Meyendorf and Hopko were deans during 
the late-twentieth century, and oversaw evolving conversations on issues such as ecumenism, 
social ethics, and the OCA’s involvement in politics.  
Ultimately, this thesis argues that throughout the twentieth century, the OCA contemplated 
whether to turn inward and defend Orthodoxy from American and earthly influence or compromise 
with outside influences in order to spread the faith across the continent. Its commitment to preserve 
Orthodoxy from secularism led to periods of isolation after the Russian Revolution, but postwar 
ecumenism and liturgical revival led clergy to reclaim evangelism as a means to bringing others 
into the true church and combatting secularism. Nonetheless, the failure of ecumenism to convert 
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the non-Orthodox complicated this narrative, leading parish priests and laity to pursue social 
conservatism to combat secularism. The first chapter will situate the OCA within the Russian 
Revolution, explaining the theological and social motivations for declaring autocephaly and 
separating from the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. The second chapter examines the 
OCA’s ecumenical relationships with Catholics and liberal Protestants as the OCA explored 
ecumenism as a means to spread Orthodoxy and stop the spread of secularism. The final chapter 
examines the OCA in the context of the rise of the Christian Right, arguing that while high clergy 
remained committed to ecumenism, some priests and laity viewed social conservatism as a better 
solution to secularism. In more recent years, the OCA has changed its relationship with American 
society and outside influence as laity and clergy become more involved in Orthodox and public 













Chapter One, Immigration, Revolution, and Ecclesiastical Crisis: Russian Orthodox 
Christians in North America, 1900-1950.  
 
Introduction 
 Patriarch Tikhon made history for the second time on November 7, 1920. For the past year, 
he had heard news of numerous military defeats for the anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia, 
collectively known as the White Army. The White Army failed to usurp the Red Army’s control 
over vital parts of Russia, specifically its capital. After the White Army’s disastrous and 
uncoordinated attacks on Moscow failed in January and July of 1919, the Civil War turned 
decisively in the Bolsheviks’ favor.24 The Red Army controlled the most people, the most 
resources, and the most important cities in Russia’s political administration. The White Army’s 
failure exiled the anti-Bolsheviks to the periphery of the fallen Russian Empire, decentralizing 
opposition forces and preventing the organization of the White Army within Russia.25 The 
Bolsheviks no longer needed an offensive military campaign; they could maintain power and 
outlive their opposition. The war ended in June 1923, two years after the White Army effectively 
disbanded.26  
 The news of the White Army’s failure hit Patriarch Tikhon hard, but it was another sign 
that he was living in unprecedented times. On October 28, 1917, he became the first patriarch of 
the Russian Orthodox Church since Tsar Peter the Great abolished the office in 1721.27 The 
restoration of the patriarchate was a consequence of the Russian Revolution and Civil War; the 
                                                 
24 S. A. Smith, Russia in Revolution: An Empire in Crisis, 1890-1928 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 174-
5. 
25 Ibid, 179; Neil Faulkner, A People’s History of the Russian Revolution (London: Pluto Press, 2017), 228. 
26 Smith, Russia in Revolution, 195; Anthony D’Agostino, The Russian Revolution: 1917-1945 (Santa Barbara: 
Praeger, 2011), 55. 
27 Michael Bourdeaux and Alexandru Popescu, “The Orthodox Church and Communism,” in The Cambridge 




end of the Romanov Dynasty abolished the previous form of Church administration: the Holy 
Synod. The remaining clergy within the Russian Orthodox Church met at the Sobor of 1917 to 
decide how to restore the Church’s administration. They did not want to replace it with another 
collegial system like the Synod – especially since that system was subject to state influence. 
Instead, they wanted a single head of the Church to be the face of opposition against the atheistic 
Bolsheviks.28 The restoration of the patriarchate was the solution. To choose the new head of the 
Church, the clergy placed three names in a container under the Miraculous Icon of Our Lady of 
Vladimir, sang an akathist (hymn), and drew Tikhon’s name from the ballot.29 With God’s blessing 
on their selection, Tikhon led the Russian Orthodox Church during the beginning of the Soviet era 
until his death in 1925. 
However, the new era did not liberate the Russian Orthodox Church from the yoke of state 
control; instead, the Bolsheviks enthusiastically seized Church lands, took away its authority over 
schools, and banned religious education in schools.30 Although he was initially hesitant to involve 
himself in politics, Tikhon wrote letters to Premier of the Soviet Union Vladimir Lenin, saying 
that Lenin “replaced Christ’s love with hatred,” forced people to “live in constant fear,” and 
“[destroyed] the national wealth and [brought] the country to ruin.”31 Despite the strong rhetoric, 
nothing came of his letters except for more attention from the Soviet government. Before his death 
in 1925, the Soviet government had tried him on several fabricated charges, including “obstructing 
famine relief acquisitions.”32 Ultimately, the Soviet government won: it placed Tikhon under 
                                                 
28 Dimitry Pospielovsky, The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary 
Press), 205.  
29 Ibid. 206.  
30 Smith, Russia in Revolution, 242. 
31 Pospielovsky, The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia, 211.  




house arrest, made him abdicate his office in 1923, and forced him to pledge loyalty publicly to 
the Soviet Union.33  
Before his failed opposition against the Soviet government, Tikhon made a decision that 
shaped the course of Orthodox history in North America. Perhaps foreseeing the dark future that 
lay ahead of him as he watched the anti-Bolshevik forces fail in November 1920, Tikhon issued 
Ukaz 362, a Church decree for Russian Orthodox Christians abroad should the Russian Orthodox 
Church fall to the Soviets:  
In case the state of affairs indicated in paragraphs 2 [war] and 4 [severed 
ecclesiastical relationships] takes on a protracted or even a permanent character, in 
particular with the impossibility for the bishop to benefit from the cooperation of 
the organs of the diocesan administration . . . the diocesan bishop: a) grants his right 
reverend vicar bishops, who now . . . enjoy the rights of semi-independent bishops, 
all the rights of diocesan bishops, with the organization by them of administration 
in conformity to local conditions and resources; b) institutes, by conciliar decision 
with the rest of the bishops of the diocese, as far as possible in all major cities of 
his own diocese, new episcopal Sees with the rights of semi-independent or 
independent bishops.34  
In other words, Russian Orthodox Christians abroad had the right to self-governance once the 
Moscow Patriarch fell to the Soviet Union.  
 Tikhon’s resolution on Russian Orthodox autonomy is one of the most important and 
controversial documents in North American Orthodox history for several reasons. First, it 
permitted the self-governance of the hundreds of pre-existing Orthodox parishes in North America. 
Second, it questioned the source of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Historically, autocephaly and self-
                                                 
33 Smith, Russia in Revolution, 367. 
34 “The Resolutions of his Holiness of Patriarch Tikhon, of the Sacred Synod and Supreme Ecclesiastical Council of 




governance had come from ecumenical councils – not resolutions from one patriarch.35 Third, 
multiple mother churches had never claimed jurisdiction over one territory – causing new, self-
governing North American churches to conflict with other Orthodox churches claiming 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction and authority in the continent.36  
 Tikhon’s resolutions unraveled Orthodox norms while allowing new groups to claim 
authority based on his resolutions. One of these groups was the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic 
Church in America (ROGCCA) - later called the Orthodox Church in America (OCA) – 
established in 1924 by North American parishes that the Russia Orthodox Church and its bishops 
had built following Russia’s settlement of Alaska.37 The other institution formed in Western 
Europe following the Russian Revolution. Established by exiled Russian bishops, it had several 
names: the Temporary High Church Administration of Southern Russian, the Temporary High 
Church Administration Abroad, and its final name, the Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia 
(ROCOR).38 The ROGCCA and ROCOR competed for authority and claimed the other lacked 
ecclesiastical authority over North America. Despite their differences, these institutions reveal how 
the Russian Revolution affected Orthodoxy in North America by altering North American 
Orthodox institutions’ relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow – the traditional 
center of Russian Orthodoxy. 
This chapter will focus on how the ROGCC, ROCOR, and the Russian Orthodox Church 
in Moscow conflicted over jurisdiction, authority, and subservience to the Moscow Patriarch. 
                                                 
35 Matthew Steenberg, “The Church,” The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology, eds. Mary B. 
Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 132. 
36 Ibid. 
37 John H. Erickson, Orthodox Christians in North America: A Short History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008) 62. 
38 Alexey Young, The Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (San Bernardino: St. Willibrord’s Press, 1993), 25.  
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Alliances and opposition between these institutions changed during the interwar period in a way 
that reflected the United States’ relationship with the Soviet Union. During the First Red Scare, 
the ROGCCA feared Bolshevik influence as the American public did. Before and during World 
War II, the ROGCCA began to recognize the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow’s authority – 
although this change was temporary like the US-Soviet alliance. Beneath the international context, 
the changing relationships between these institutions reveals how the Russian Revolution affected 
North American Orthodox history. By ending the relationship between the Church in Moscow and 
the ROGCCA, the Russian Revolution forced North American Orthodox Christians to administrate 
their own diocese – effectively making them autonomous despite their claims to independence 
breaking with Orthodoxy’s norms. Later efforts to reunify the ROGCCA with the Russian 
Orthodox Church in Moscow showed a commitment to established ecclesiastical order. However, 
the failure to reunify reveals how American society affected North American Orthodox Christians: 
American public opinion had accepted North American Orthodox Christians for their efforts to 
fight Bolshevism, and they attempted to Americanize by performing services in English and urging 
members to assimilate by learning English. While fear of Bolshevik influence drove the ROGCCA 
away from Moscow, the administrative and cultural divides between the Church in Moscow and 
the ROGCCA kept them apart. North American Orthodox Christians valued autonomy over its 
relationship with the Church in Moscow, preventing reunification with the Russian Patriarch.  
This first chapter will focus on the ROGCCA in the early twentieth century and its reactions 
to the Russian Revolution. In doing so, it will answer two questions about the impact of the Russian 
Revolution on North American Orthodoxy in the early twentieth century. First, how did the 
Revolution alter the relationship between Russian and North American Orthodox Church 
institutions? Second, how did the Russian Revolution affect Russian Orthodox emigres in 
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America? To answer the first question, this chapter will establish the relationship between the 
Russian Orthodox Church and its North American Diocese before and after the Russian Revolution 
with newspaper articles on Church affairs and resolutions from North American Orthodox Church 
meetings. To answer the second question, this chapter will cite census data to place North 
American Orthodox Christians in the context of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
Russian immigration; moreover, this chapter will use articles from major American newspapers 
and Christian magazines to illustrate American views of Russian Orthodox Christians before and 
after the Red Scare. With these articles, this chapter will demonstrate how American public 
opinion on Russians changed from xenophobia to sympathy towards Russian Orthodox Christians, 
whom Americans viewed as victims of the Soviet government – but Americans still lacked 
interests in Orthodoxy. Overall, exploring these phenomena will help readers understand the 
impact of the Russian Revolution on North American Orthodox Christianity and the experiences 
of its followers. Furthermore, this chapter traces the roots of problems the Orthodox Church in 
America faced throughout the twentieth century: claiming ecclesiastical authority and making their 
faith comprehendible to the white, Protestant mainstream.  
The Russian Orthodox Church in North America before the Russian Revolution and Its 
Relationship with the Tsarist Regime 
Before 1917, Orthodoxy in North America had strong ties to the Old World, especially 
through the Russian Empire. With the settlement of Alaska, monks and clergy of the Russian 
Orthodox Church saw North America as a means to expand its influence. Settlements established 
by the Russian-American Company provided bases for Russian Orthodox missionaries to convert 
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the native population.39 This coupling of colonial trade and missionary work ended after Russia 
sold Alaska to the United States in 1867 – although the Orthodox churches and over thirty 
settlements remained.40 The Russian Tsar maintained his interest in expanding Orthodoxy in North 
America. The same year, Metropolitan Innocent of Moscow recommended relocating the diocesan 
seat from Sitka, Alaska to San Francisco, California.41 The decision was strategic: although the 
population was small, Russian immigration to San Francisco was slowly making the city the center 
of Russian Orthodoxy in North America.42  
However, being the center of Russian Orthodoxy in North America did not mean that the 
Church was experiencing success spreading its religion. It was moderately successful in Alaska. 
By 1902, the Church had 11,758 members – of whom only 87 were Russian.43 The rest of the 
Church membership were native Alaskans.44 The Russian Orthodox Church had directed its 
mission efforts towards indigenous populations, but that success did not occur in the mainland 
United States.  
In the mainland United States, conversions to Orthodoxy came primarily from ethno-
cultural struggles led by people outside the Church. Most Russian Orthodox membership growth 
came from the Carpatho-Russyns’ conflicts with the Catholic Church. During the nineteenth 
century, the historically Eastern Orthodox Carpatho-Russyns were part of the Greek Catholic 
Church. One rule that differentiated the Carpatho-Russyns from the Roman Catholic Church was 
they allowed priests to marry. In Europe, the Catholic Church permitted Carpatho-Russyns to have 
                                                 
39 Gregory Afonsky, A History of the Orthodox Church in Alaska, 1794-1917 (Kodiak: St. Herman’s Theological 
Seminary), 1-14. 
40 Ibid, 14.  
41 George Michalopulos, The American Orthodox church: A History of its Beginnings (Salisbury: Regina Orthodox 
Press, 2003), 14. 
42 Erickson, Orthodox Christians in America, 32.  
43 Afonsky, A History of the Orthodox Church in Alaska, 86.  
44 Ibid.  
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this practice, as long as it remained isolated to the Greek Catholic Church. When Carpatho-
Russyns – totally 350,000 by 1917 – arrived in the United States, they expected to remain separate 
from other Catholics, but the Catholic Church expected them to join preexisting Latin parishes.45  
Tensions rose as Capartho-Russyns tried to join Latin parishes. In 1889, Alexis Toth, a 
widowed Greek Catholic priest, came to Minneapolis, Minnesota to join the clergy of St. Mary’s 
Greek Catholic Church. Toth met resistance from Archbishop John Ireland of Minneapolis, who 
questioned Toth’s credentials.46 According to Toth, they had a heated exchange. Ireland said he 
had no need for a Greek Catholic priest, as he already had a Polish priest and “the Greek Catholics 
could have him for their priest.”47 He also told Toth that being a widower disqualified him from 
serving in the Church and that he had “already written to Rome protesting against this kind of 
priest being sent to me.”48  
This episode was a concern for the Carpatho-Russyn community. Besides his feud with 
Toth, Ireland was frustrated that the immigrants had opened their own parish without his 
permission.49 Fearing the archbishop would seize their property, St. Mary’s and other Greek 
Catholic churches banded together. One trustee of St. Mary’s traveled to San Francisco to meet 
Russian Orthodox Bishop Nicholas, building a connection between the Orthodox Church and the 
parish.50 After Nicholas cordially received the trustee, Toth started corresponding with him. In two 
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years, Toth and all 361 members of St. Mary’s rejoined the Orthodox Church that their ancestors 
had left three centuries earlier.51  
Toth and St. Mary’s parishoner’s conversion resulted from the distance between the 
Carpatho-Russyns and the Catholic Church. Historically, the Carpatho-Russyns were Orthodox, 
but efforts to assimilate them into the Polish-Lithuania Commonwealth and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire led to their conversion to Catholicism. Under the Union of Uzhhorod, Orthodox priests in 
the Kingdom of Austria agreed join the Catholic Church under three conditions: the preservation 
of eastern rites, the right to choose bishops, and having the privileges of the Roman Catholic 
clergy.52 In the nineteenth century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire continued this relationship with 
the Carpatho-Russyns: the empire refused to grant autonomy to their churches, keeping the 
Carpatho-Russyns in the Catholic Church but allowing them to maintain eastern practice.53 
Although the empires were satisfied with the Carpatho-Russyns’ joining the Catholic Church, there 
was a disconnect between the Carpatho-Russyns religious identity and practice: Formally, they 
were under the Catholic Church, but their churches were functionally Eastern Orthodox. 
This disconnect allowed the Carpatho-Russyns to have non-Catholic practices such as 
widowed clergy, sparking controversy when the Catholic Church refused to allow Carpatho-
Russyns to form their own parishes in America. Furthermore, America allowed the Carpatho-
Russyns to reevaluate their religious affiliations. Toth was the leader of this movement. 
Throughout his life, he struggled to reconcile the differences between Eastern and Western 
Christianity while being a Catholic priest.54 The conflict with Ireland brought this tension to the 
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forefront. To Toth, maintaining eastern traditions was more important than submitting to the Pope. 
Moreover, Toth’s Russophilism made him more inclined to reconnect with the Russian Orthodox 
Church.55 Without the pressures of Old World governments to assimilate to Catholicism, Toth led 
Carpatho-Russyn immigrants into the Orthodox Church, resulting in 163 new Orthodox parishes 
and around 100,000 new members by 1916.56  
Toth’s story is central to the Orthodox Church in America’s (OCA) history and the 
complex ethno-cultural nature of Orthodox identity in America. An article on the OCA’s website 
commemorates his life. The article mentions his conflict with Ireland and the conversion of St. 
Mary’s and portrays him as an exemplary leader of the American mission. According to the article, 
Toth “uprooted the tares which had sprung up in the wheat of true doctrine, and exposed the false 
teachings which had led people astray.”57 In other word, Toth fulfilled the Russian Orthodox 
Church’s American mission by returning his community to Orthodoxy. In 1905, Bishop Tikhon 
recognized Toth’s accomplishments: “the diocese is not only multinational: It is composed of 
several Orthodox churches, which keep the unity of the faith but preserve their peculiarities in 
canonical structure, in liturgical rules, in parish life.” To Tikhon and his peers, ethnic differences 
were unimportant; shared religion sufficed for acceptance in the Orthodox Church. In contrast, 
some early twentieth-century Catholic clergy pushed immigrants to assimilate for two reasons: 
they wanted parishes to unite and not maintain ethnic divisions; second, they were sensitive to 
anti-Catholicism that argued that Catholics were incompatible with America.58 As this chapter 
discusses later, American were prejudiced against Russians, but Americans were hostile when 
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Russians enforced ethnic boundaries or spread Russian culture – not when they spread their faith. 
Like the Catholics, Tikhon avoided enflaming prejudice against his Church, but did so in a 
different way: respecting ethnic boundaries as long as the converts had the correct theology.      
As outsiders spread Orthodoxy in America, the Tsar remained interested in North 
American Orthodox institutions. In a New York Times article about the consecration of an 
iconostasis at the Russian Cathedral of St. Nicholas in New York City, one can see the presence 
of the Tsarist regime and its importance to Orthodoxy in North America. On October 24, 1904, 
Bishop Tikhon, then Metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, “sprinkled 
all the icons on the altar with holy water” while officials and dukes from the Russian imperial 
government watched.59 The attendance of these officials showed the American audience a ritual 
connection between North American Orthodoxy and the Russian Empire; however, after 
consecrating the icons, Tikhon made the connection between religion and the Tsar explicit. He 
addressed the congregation, saying,  
“Our gracious Emperor, the holy son of the Church, head and commander of the 
faithful, was the first to contribute to [an icon]. After his holy example, others 
followed. . . . Today . . . our cathedral stands complete, the gleaming symbol of our 
faith and the pride and beauty of our Church in the western hemisphere.”60  
Tikhon’s recognition of the Tsar Nicholas II’s gift and cathedral indicates more than gratitude for 
the donation; it illuminates the ecclesiastical order between North American and Russian Orthodox 
institutions before the Russian Revolution. The Russian Orthodox Church decided the locations of 
diocesan seats, oversaw the consecration of icons, and donated icons from the Tsar to North 
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American Orthodox cathedrals. In other words, North American Orthodox communities derived 
authority from the Russian Orthodox Church and the Tsarist regime. 
The American Public’s Views of the Russian Orthodox Church, Russia, and its Immigrants during 
the Early Twentieth Century  
 As the Russian Empire, the Russian Orthodox Church, and Tsar Nicholas II maintained 
their relationships with North American Orthodoxy, Americans became more interested in Russia. 
The Russian Empire’s domestic affairs were the reason for this increased interest. In the summer 
of 1891, the Black Earth region of Russia experienced major crop failure. Compared to the average 
harvest from 1883-7, crop production dropped by 26 percent.61 The resulting famine affected 
roughly 13 million inhabitants and killed 400,000 people.62 Besides starvation, the famine 
exacerbated Russia’s rural economic inequality. For example, the proportion of Russian 
households without horses rose from 61.9 percent in 1888 to1891 to 68 percent in 1899 to 1900 to 
74 percent in 1912.63 The loss of livestock signaled growing class divisions, as rich Russians who 
afforded livestock consolidated the good. Moreover, the famine disrupted the Imperial budget. In 
1891, famine relief constituted twenty percent of the budget. From 1889-1898, famine relief 
constituted ten percent of extraordinary budget expenditures.64 In other words, famines strained 
the Russian imperial budget and economy for a decade.  
 Economic and agricultural crisis preceded the political and social crises that gripped Russia 
during the 1905 Revolution. Historians rightly agree that defeat in the Russo-Japanese War 
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sparked the 1905 Revolution.65 The loss revealed to Russian imperial subjects the many failures 
of the Tsarist regime: systemic rural poverty despite the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the 
repression of urban populations. Peasants took advantage of the wounded Russian military to 
launch their assault, especially in the Black Earth provinces – those most affected by the Russian 
Famine of 1891-2. The inhabitants launched attacks against landlords, burning and destroying 
estates, and seizing land for themselves.66 In St. Petersburg, workers went on strike to protest 
Russian soldiers murdering unarmed protesters on Bloody Sunday and demand the right to 
unionize.67 After months of strikes, protests, and unrest, Tsar Nicholas II issued the October 
Manifesto, which promised basic civil liberties and an elected legislature, the Duma.68  
 The American public’s reaction to Russia’s unrest was altruistic. During the 1890s, major 
American newspapers reported on the famine. In August 1892, the Los Angeles Times published 
a feature article on the experience of Russians in the Volga afflicted by the famine. The article 
enumerated the causes of victims’ suffering: loss of livestock, the fear of disease, and the anxiety 
over the next harvest.69 The author portrayed the victims sympathetically, depicting them as pious 
and humble. Moreover, the article stressed the need for relief, writing, “[Russians’] wants are so 
small that 2 cents a day per person has kept thousands alive . . . $8 a day had been the total cost of 
feeding 400 people for weeks.”70Americans listened to calls for relief, as reported by the New York 
Tribune in December 1892, and donated a million and a half pounds of flour for famine relief.71 
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With relief funds and sympathetic portrayals of Russians, Americans built a humanitarian 
relationship with the Russian Empire.   
 However, sympathy for Russians ended when they arrived in America. Articles on the 
Russian Orthodox Church’s activities in the US and Russian immigration were xenophobic. One 
New York Times article from 1905 covered the change in headquarters for the Russian Orthodox 
Church from San Francisco, California to New York City, New York. The author wrote that the 
“increased immigration of the last few years” led the Church to move the seat.72 This fact is not 
contentious; Tikhon acknowledged immigration to the east coast as the reason.73 However, the 
article moved its focus away from the Church’s affairs and onto immigration. The author argued 
that immigration from Russia would continue because its political issues are likely to continue; 
however, the author found hope in this future because “better educated and wealthier Russians” 
could immigrate and “give a greatly improved quality of immigration from Russia.”74 Even in 
reports about mundane, bureaucratic proceedings, xenophobia permeated in articles about 
Russians in the United States.  
The image of the uneducated Russian reflected American xenophobia in the late nineteenth 
century. In 1888, a report to the Annual Conference of Superintendents of Institutions for the 
Feebleminded characterized immigration outside of Northern Europe as a “sewage of vice and 
crime and physical weakness.”75 United States government officials agreed with the report, and 
throughout the 1890s, “undesirable” emerged to mark immigrants with who were “neither 
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physically nor mentally” fit.76 “Undesirable” began to describe Russian immigrants in government 
documents and scientific research because of the work of eugenicists in the early twentieth century, 
namely Henry H. Goddard. While working at Ellis Island, Goddard conducted tests on Russian 
immigrants to determine their intellectual capacity.77 His published results found that 82 percent 
of Russian immigrants were “morons” and advocated for the United States government to restrict 
or terminate Russian immigration.78   
The most restrictive quotas on Russian immigration would come with the Immigration Act 
of 1924. In the meantime, Americans’ anti-Russian attitudes focused on the Russian Orthodox 
Church. In 1913, the New York Times published a defaming piece on Russian Orthodox Christians. 
The piece argued that the Russian Orthodox Church sought to “[transform] all Slavs residents into 
Russians.”79 In other words, it tried to bring Serbs, Byelorussians, and other Slavic groups together 
and prevent them from Americanizing. The piece claimed the move of the diocesan seat from 
Alaska to San Francisco proved that the Czar was attempting to “russify” immigrants to the US 
and prevent their assimilation into American society.80 While other Slavic populations did enter 
the Russian Orthodox Church before the Russian Revolution, it was not a conspiracy to increase 
the Tsar’s influence; rather, it was because other Slavic Orthodox churches had yet not founded 
parishes in North America.81 In fact, the Russian Orthodox Church had been a force of 
Americanization; since the late 1800s, it had allowed clergy to deliver sermons in English and had 
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published some journals in English.82 Nonetheless, the Russian Empire’s centuries-old mission to 
expand Orthodoxy into North America made it a target for American xenophobia: the Orthodox 
Church was foreign and, therefore, detrimental to American society because Russians were inferior 
and their institutions prevented assimilation.  
Although their fears were xenophobic and racist, white Protestant Americans were 
responding to a real rise in Russian immigration during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Census data from 1900 and 1910 shows a dramatic increase in the number of Russians 
immigrating to America. In this decade, Russians became the United States’ second largest 
foreign-born population with approximately 1.5 million immigrants.83 In other words, Russian 
immigration to the US more than tripled since the previous decade.  
The cause of this spike in immigration was the Russian Famine of 1891-2. During the 
1880s, 182,644 Russians immigrated to the US.84 However, the number more than doubled during 
the 1890s, when 424,372 Russian immigrants came to the US.85 This data strongly suggests that 
the famine spurred Russian immigration to the United States; however, the US Census did not 
collect data on religious affiliation, so it does not prove that Russian Orthodox Christians 
immigrated to the US during this period. It is also important to note that Russian Jews fleeing 
pogroms accounted for hundreds of thousands of immigrants during this period.86 However, other 
census data reveals that the famine disproportionately affected Russian Orthodox Christians. An 
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1897 census conducted by the Russian Empire found that 71 percent of its population were 
Orthodox Christians.87 Although they constituted a majority of the population, they were not 
prevalent in urban centers. Among the Empire’s ethnic groups, Russians ranked eleventh in rate 
of urbanization, trailing behind Germans (23.4 percent), Armenians (23.3 percent), and Greeks (18 
percent) and falling below the Empire’s 13.4 percent average.88 In other words, Russian Orthodox 
Christians were disproportionately rural and affected by the famine, suggesting that they 
constituted a significant portion of Russians immigrating to the United States during the 1890s. 
While urbanization rates, immigration trends, and the Russian Famine of 1891-2 suggest 
that a substantial portion of Russian immigrants to the US were from Russian Orthodox Christians, 
it does not show how many Russian immigrants joined the Orthodox Church in America. 
Moreover, decennial censuses do not record church memberships or immigrant status of members. 
However, special reports on religious bodies published by the Census Bureau fill this information 
gap. The 1906 report found that the Russian Orthodox Church had 19,111 members while all 
Orthodox churches had 129,606 members combined.89 In 1916, the report found that the Russian 
Orthodox Church had 99,681 members while all Orthodox churches had 247,828 members 
combined.90 While these reports do not reveal how many immigrants joined the Russian Orthodox 
Church in North America, its 81 percent increase in membership during a decade when 1.5 million 
Russian immigrants came to the US suggests that immigration fueled the Church’s growth.  
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An “American” Orthodox Church on the Eve of the Russian Revolution 
This influx of immigrants inspired some institutional changes in the years before 1917. For 
example, since most Russian immigrants came from European Russia during this time, New York 
City became the new center of Russian Orthodoxy in North America – leading Bishop Tikhon to 
move the Church’s North American headquarters there in 1905.91 Moreover, immigration led the 
North American Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church in a new direction. In March 1907, 
Tikhon gathered clergy from around the United States at the First All-American Sobor.92 This 
meeting was the first time North American Orthodox clergy gathered to discuss Church issues.93 
The meeting had symbolic importance: North American parishes cooperated to discuss canonical 
issues instead of waiting for the instruction of the Holy Synod. In other words, localized parishes 
became more important in the governance of the North American Diocese of the Russian Orthodox 
Church as membership increased.   
This meeting was a pivotal moment for North American Orthodox Christians because it 
signaled a new direction for their Church. Tikhon declared the meeting’s central theme as “How 
to expand the mission.”94 While the title implies proselytization, the topic of the Sobor was self-
governance.95 Since Tikhon was an archbishop of the Russian Orthodox Church, it seemed odd for 
him to organize a meeting that subverted the authority the Church. However, the Sobor presented 
a change in his attitudes towards the church.  Beginning with his arrival in New York City in 1905, 
Tikhon had suggested that Orthodoxy in North America was different from Old World Orthodoxy. 
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In a report to the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, he wrote “the diocese is not only 
multinational: It is composed of several Orthodox churches, which keep the unity of the faith but 
preserve their peculiarities in canonical structure, in liturgical rules, in parish life.”96 The North 
American Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church was becoming less distinctively Russian and 
more multiethnic. Before the Sobor, Toth had led Capartho-Russyns away from the Catholic 
Church and into Orthodoxy.97 For Tikhon, their conversions showed him that Eastern Christians 
in North America united under an Eastern identity, not Old World identities such as Greek, 
Russian, or Antiochian. To respect these differences, Tikhon wanted the North American Diocese 
to have more self-governing powers. 
 Although the Sobor did not result in self-governing powers, primarily because the Church 
had reassigned Tikhon to Russia and his tenure as archbishop was over, it allowed the North 
American Diocese to define itself outside of Russia’s influence. At the meeting, the North 
American Diocese named itself the “Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church in North America” 
(ROGCCNA). The clergy still recognized the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church; however, 
they wanted to embrace its multiethnic membership. Decades later, ROGCCNA clergy suggested 
that the name change reflected a need to help the newly converted Capartho-Russyns feel 
comfortable in the Orthodox Church.98 While this analysis makes sense given the meeting’s 
context, the messaging of the Sobor suggests that the clergy wanted more Christians than Greek 
Catholics to enter the Church. When justifying the name change, the Sobor reported that “Our 
North American Orthodox Church considers itself as being Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic . . . 
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embracing all nations, all countries . . . the first herald of Orthodoxy in America.”99 This 
characterization of North American Orthodoxy envisions a new church – one with jurisdiction 
over all of America – instead of multiple Orthodox Churches establishing dioceses across North 
America and transplanting Old World ethnic divisions onto the continent. While the Sobor did not 
reject the Russian Orthodox Church’s authority, it recognized that the “Russianness” of the North 
American Diocese was deteriorating – preparing ROGCCNA to distance itself from the Russian 
Orthodox Church in Moscow after the Russian Revolution. 
Financial and Ecclesiastical Crisis after the Russian Revolution and Moves towards Autonomy 
 Twelve years passed between the First and Second Sobors; in that time, the Russian 
Revolution tore apart the relationship between the North American Diocese and the Russian 
Orthodox Church in Moscow. The Russian Revolution did not immediately interrupt the Church; 
rather, its head – the newly appointed Patriarch Tikhon – operated the Church with increasingly 
limited autonomy and antagonism from the Soviets until his arrest in 1923.100 In the meantime, 
Tikhon had declared the resolutions that allowed Russian Orthodox bodies abroad to establish 
temporary autonomy.101 Nonetheless, the North American diocese’s financial dependence on the 
Church in Moscow exacerbated its problems. Without the support of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, parishes could not afford their property, causing them to mortgage and sell Church 
property.102 By 1919, the diocese’s debts totaled $218,023.103 Furthermore, the Bolshevik 
Revolution prevented the Archbishop of the North American Diocese Evdokim from returning to 
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the United States.104 Without money, leadership, or a stable connection to Moscow, the diocese 
was in crisis.   
 In February 1919, the Second All-American Sobor convened in Cleveland, Ohio to resolve 
these problems. Without a hierarch, archbishop, or funds, the clergy failed to solve most of the 
issues except for the election of a new archbishop. The clergy elected Bishop Alexander, whom 
Evdokum had appointed temporary administrator of the diocese before his departure to Russia a 
year before, to the position of Archbishop of the North American Diocese.105 This process broke 
Church precedent. Before, the Holy Synod selected the North American Archbishop – as it had 
done for Tikhon. With the Holy Synod abolished, Tikhon would appoint archbishops, but 
communication with the Church in Moscow was inconsistent after the Russian Revolution.106 With 
Bolshevik persecution of the Church impeding the Patriarch’s ability to perform his duties, North 
American Orthodox clergy unilaterally administered the diocese. Although the Russian Orthodox 
Church in Moscow approved the selection a year later, the North American Diocese had seized 
opportunities to exercise more autonomy over its affairs during crisis.107  
 The North American Diocese became more autonomous and independent after the Russian 
Revolution due to the systemic changes it had to institute in response to its financial crises. 
Following the Russian Revolution, funds – which had totaled $1,000,000 in 1916 – from the 
Church in Moscow ceased.108 The Council of Bishops in North America imposed measures to 
compensate the losses before the Second All-American Sobor. In June 1917, Church 
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administration decided to assess part of the parishes’ collections.109 Still lacking enough resources 
to cover their expenses, the Second All-American Sobor decided to impose a five-percent tax on 
all parishes and a two-percent tax on priests’ annual income.110 It also decided to sell the National 
Home and the Immigrants’ home in New York.111 The diocese struggled to achieve financial 
stability after the Russian Revolution, but its efforts to demonstrate a partially successful attempt 
to self-govern and replace revenue from the Church in Moscow.  
 While the Second All-American Sobor progressed towards financial and administrative 
stability, a new challenge to the diocese’s authority emerged. A new group called the “Living 
Church” formed from Moscow. These clergy were instruments of the Soviet regime; with Soviet 
support, they deposed Tikhon from the Patriarchate, seized control of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, and began attempting to influence the North American Diocese.112 To control the diocese, 
the “Living Church” tried to control its administration and land. After the election of Alexander, 
the “Living Church” appointed its own Metropolitan of North America, John Kerdovsty. The 
decision was slightly effective. Because the Church in Moscow chose him, Kerdovsty received 
legal recognition as the Head of the Diocese.113 However, North American Orthodox Christians 
remained largely loyal to Alexander. After Tikhon’s forced pledge of allegiance to the Soviet 
government, they were skeptical of clergy in Moscow, ultimately viewing Moscow clergy as a 
front for Bolshevik influence.114 Nonetheless, legal recognition of the Church’s head allowed 
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Kerdovsty to seize Church property from Alexander.115 The challenge against Alexander 
threatened to subvert his power and worsen the diocese’s financial troubles.  
 In 1922, Alexander called the Third All-American Sobor to elect a new Archbishop who 
could confront these problems. At the meeting, the clergy elected Metropolitan Platon. Returning 
to the US as a refugee of the Russian Civil War, Platon was less cooperative with the “Living 
Church.” Kerdovsty continued to seize Church assets, leading Platon to direct local parishes to 
register deeds in their priest’s name.116 While this move gave more power to local parishes, it also 
further distanced North American Orthodox Churches from the Church in Moscow. Platon 
affirmed this distance two years later. In 1924, viewing the “Living Church” as illegitimate and 
destructive to the North American Diocese, the Fourth All-American Sobor passed a resolution to  
Temporarily . . . declare the Russian Orthodox Church in America to be a Self-
Governing Church, so that it be governed by its own elected Archbishop by means 
of a Council of Bishops, a council composed of those elected from the clergy and 
the laity, and that the periodic Sobors be held of the entire American Church.117 
On the authority of Tikhon’s 1920 Resolutions, the North American Diocese declared itself 
temporarily autonomous until it could rebuild a relationship with Moscow. Moreover, it affirmed 
the authority of the bodies that had gained power since the Russian Revolution: the All-American 
Sobors, the Council of Bishops, and the Archbishop – now Metropolitan – of the North American 
Diocese.  
   Affirming its own institutions and declaring temporary autonomy offered stability to 
North American Orthodoxy; however, debates arose over whether the Diocese legitimately 
declared autonomy. Throughout Orthodox history, ecumenical councils declared autocephaly for 
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a Church – not a single patriarch.118 However, this case was different. Temporary autonomy would 
continue, as the diocese declared, “until the convocation of the All-Russian Sobor” where  
Legally convoked and legally elected representatives of the [Russian Orthodox 
Church] will sit with representatives of the American Church under conditions of 
political freedom, guaranteeing the fullness and authority of its decisions as a True 
Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church.119 
In other words, once the Soviet government lost power or stopped interfering with the Church in 
Moscow, the North American Diocese would recognize the Church’s authority.  
 Although Orthodox history had no precedent for temporary autonomy, Orthodox 
Christians debated whether the diocese’s declaration of self-governance fit Tikhon’s 
qualifications. The resolutions specified war, severed ecumenical relations, and “the impossibility 
for the bishop to benefit from the cooperation of the organs of the diocesan administration” as 
justification for temporary autonomy.120 The diocese’s declaration does not fit the first 
qualification since the Russian Civil War had ended a year before the Fourth All-American Sobor. 
Whether the diocese had severed ecumenical relations with the Church in Moscow depended on 
whether the “Living Church” was legitimate. Since the Soviets supported it, North American 
Orthodox Christians viewed it as illegitimate. Nonetheless, the Church in Moscow maintained its 
connection with the diocese after the overthrow of Tikhon, although the relationship became 
antagonistic and encumbered with legal challenges.121  
 However, the relationship between the diocese and the Church in Moscow seemed 
detrimental to North America – or, at best, neutral. With the cessation of funding from the Church 
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in Moscow, the diocese faced increasing debt without a means to cover their expenses.122 The 
Church in Moscow stopped sending clergy to North America, at first because of the Russian Civil 
War, and later because of the hostility between the Church and the diocese.123 Their relationship 
became antagonistic through court battles and harmful to the diocese as the Church claimed 
ownership over properties, disallowing their use by the diocese.  
 At the Fourth All-American Sobor, clergy enumerated the threat that the “Living Church” 
posed to North America. One priest asked how the diocese could survive when it “[faces] the 
danger of losing [its] Church properties? How do we [the diocese] safeguard our future generations 
from the Bolshevik yoke?”124 Other clergy echoed his fear of Soviet influence and distrust in the 
Church in Moscow. Another priest characterized the Church in Moscow as enslaved to the Soviet’s 
will: “there is no religious freedom [in Russia]; even more than that, at the present time in Russia 
there exists the most cruel and merciless persecution of every religion and its representatives.”125 
Since the Soviet government controlled the Church in Moscow through persecution, the diocese 
could not trust the Church’s decrees or obey its authority without following the will of the 
Bolsheviks. Moreover, the actions of Kedrovsky proved to the Sobor that the “Living Church” 
sought to undermine the diocese by seizing its property for the Soviet government.126 When the 
diocese declared temporary autonomy in 1924, incorporating itself as the Russian Orthodox Greek 
Catholic Church in America (ROGCCA), it did so motivated by fear of Bolshevik influence and 
an agreement that the Church of Moscow would continue to undermine North American Orthodox 
institutions.   
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White Protestant American Views of Russians and their Church after the Revolution 
Fear of Bolshevik influence spread beyond the North American Diocese and across the 
United States following the Russian Revolution. In the First Red Scare, anti-communist action 
took many forms, most notably in the Overman Committee. Chaired by Senator Lee Overman, the 
committee sought to determine whether Bolshevik influence inspired or facilitated the Seattle 
General Strike in 1919.127 The findings of the Overman Committee alarmed many Americans. It 
found that not only had foreign-sponsored radicalism incited the strike, but that Bolsheviks were 
attempting to erode American culture.128 One New York Tribune article from 1919 reported a 
finding of the Overman Committee: the Soviets planned to spread “forced free love” around the 
world by offering compensation to pregnant women.129 The Overman Committee concluded that 
the Soviet government sought to erode every part of American life. Suspicion of Bolshevik 
influence spread beyond labor movements and became widespread in American society. 
During the Red Scare, Americans idealized Russian Orthodox piety. In 1917, the Los 
Angeles Times praised Russian Orthodox Christians, calling them one of “the most religious 
groups on earth.”130 Granted, the praise included echoes of Goddard’s portrayal or Russians. The 
article characterized Russians as “simple,” but their simplicity endows them with “kindness,” 
“virtue,” and the inclination towards religious devotion.131  
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Moreover, the article added a political twist to its assessment of Russian Orthodoxy: it is 
good for democracy. The article envisioned a “New Order . . . a democracy [strengthened by] the 
sincere simplicity of the Russian people.”132 The article also predicted that the Revolution would 
end with a democratic “New Order . . . made by an enlightened clergy, an educated peasantry, and 
the spirit of Christian good will to all peoples.”133 Compared to contemporary opinions towards 
non-Protestants, this article’s analysis of Russian Orthodoxy was surprising. During the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, anti-Catholic activists argued that Catholics were unfit 
for democracy because their loyalty to the pope made them disloyal to the state.134 On the other 
hand, this author believed that Orthodoxy was conducive to democracy. The reason for this 
difference is anti-Catholic bias. The article explained that Orthodoxy broke from Catholicism 
when “the pope of Rome claimed primacy.”135 Like Protestants, Orthodoxy rejected the pope’s 
authority, suggesting they could be loyal to a state. According to the author, Orthodox Christians 
had proved their ability to represent their own interests again when they removed the “secular head 
of the Church” – the tsar.136  In the end, this author was not arguing that Orthodox immigrants 
would benefit American democracy; his opinion reflected anti-papal bias. Russians, unlike 
Catholics, could enjoy democracy in Russia because they refused to bow to Church authority.     
This article also echoed an idea about Christianity and democracy that had existed in the 
American zeitgeist for a century. According to Alexis de Tocqueville’s work on American society, 
democracy in America arose from American Christianity and thrived because of the country’s 
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stable moral foundations.137 The author projected this idea onto Russia. The author disregarded the 
traditions, liturgy, history, and beliefs that differentiated Russian Orthodoxy from Western 
Christianity – except to contrast it with Catholicism. To the author, a non-Catholic, Christian moral 
foundation was enough to democratize any country, including Russia. Although the Revolution 
established a communist regime, American media understood the turmoil through its own lens. 
Since Christianity formed the basis of American democracy, it could do the same in Russia.  
Mainstream, white Protestant magazines had similar reactions. One mainline Protestant 
magazine that covered the Revolution was The Christian Century. As the self-described “Christian 
intelligentsia of all the church,” the Century was nondenominational and its owner Charles Clayton 
Morrison wanted it to spread “progressive opinion in all such denominations.”138 One can see this 
impulse reflected in their reporting on the Revolution. Journalists continued covering the harsh 
conditions that Russian peasants experienced – although now, their poverty was due to Bolshevik 
usurpers, not a tsar. One 1922 article titled “Cannibalism Breaks out in Russia” reported that some 
Russians have resorted to “eating a four-year-old child.”139 The author assures that this story is 
from a reliable source, but instead of debating its truth, it is more productive to consider its 
rhetorical use. The article advocated for increased famine relief to Russia after President Hoover 
banned the American Committee for Russian Famine Relief from sending aid.140 The author 
recognized the political motivations of his decision, as Hoover wanted to prevent Bolsheviks from 
receiving aid, but the article argued this approach was inappropriate: “The good Samaritan in 
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Russia will not ask any man whether he was formerly bourgeois or of the proletariat.”141 
Ultimately, the author urges Hoover to lift the ban before more stories about cannibalism in Russia 
make headlines: “Let us have an end of political propaganda until the dying men and women of 
Russia are fed. We may sit down and discuss Karl Marx – if we are in the mood.”142  
Mainline Protestants’ interest in Russia expanded beyond its concerns for its citizens. In 
the same year, The Christian Century published another article titled “Revolution and Missions.” 
The focus of the article was the Bolshevik’s attacks on the Russian Orthodox Church. The author 
Jerome K. Davis wrote that Russians “profess to be Christian” and he shares the excitement that 
for “hundreds of years this church has been held in bondage to a corrupt and autocratic tsardom. 
Today, these bonds of oppression and tyranny have been destroyed.”143 The author saw the 
destruction of the Tsarist regime as permission for the Russian Orthodox Church to “champion the 
cause of Christ unfettered,” but the Bolsheviks prevented its freedom.144 To Davis, American 
Christians should help Russians combat the Bolsheviks, but he qualified the types of missions they 
should conduct. He warned that the point of helping Russians was “not to build up the Protestant 
faith but to help the Orthodox Church.”145 Davis believed that keeping Russians Christian was 
more important than converting it to Protestantism. The best way to do so was to support its 
preexisting institutions.    
This article from Christian Century is similar to the Los Angeles Times article. Both articles 
celebrated the freedom of the Russian people after the downfall of the tsarist regime. Both articles 
seemed uninterested in the details of Russian Orthodoxy. Granted, The Christian Century article 
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advised missionaries and Christian institutions to support Russian ecclesiastical institutions rather 
than proselytize Protestantism. The article also demonstrated basic knowledge of Russian 
Orthodoxy, such as the church started in the ninth century and Orthodox churches use icons, 
incense, candles, and music.146 David mentioned the characteristics of Russian Orthodoxy in 
passing, focusing more on Russian peasants’ desire for American Christianity. As he wrote, 
“priests stand calling for the programs and principles that western Christianity has proved and 
found good.”147 Furthermore, he said that Russians wanted Americans’ “Christian books . . . [and] 
devotional, inspirational, and social literature.”148 These statements contradict his advice to 
American Christians. Sharing American Christian literature would spread Protestantism to 
Russians. Although Davis encouraged American Christians to support the Russian Orthodox 
Church and not spread Protestantism in Russia, his discussions of Russians’ religious interests 
reveal that he believed Russians yearned for Protestantism – suggesting they would convert as 
American Christians funded missions and supported the Russian Orthodox Church. 
Compared to the mainline Protestants, Christian fundamentalists were more explicit about 
their evangelistic goals. Fundamentalists stressed the importance of “stand[ing] and bear[ing] 
testimony” to the unsaved because of premillennialism.149 In the early twentieth century, many 
fundamentalist leaders thought they were living in the end times.150 Armageddon was coming and 
time was running out to save humanity. Fundamentalists were also the defenders of sola scriptura. 
They defended their reading of Scripture against the challenges of modernism, such as biblical 
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criticism and science.151 The reason for protecting the Bible was the fundamentalists believed it 
was key to Christianity. It was inerrant, or, as Charles Hodge wrote, a “storehouse of facts.”152 
Scripture held the truth about the world and to attaining salvation, which the reader could find by 
reading it.153 To fundamentalists, protecting Scripture meant defending its authority on matters 
ranging from history to geological and biological science, as well as humanity’s path to salvation.  
In their coverage of the Russian Revolution, fundamentalists focused on mission in 
accordance with their understanding of sola scriptura. In the fundamentalist magazine Moody 
Monthly, several articles lamented Russians’ lack of access to Scripture. One 1921 article titled 
“Bible Famine in Russia” shared that Bible societies had printed only 350,000 Russian Bibles over 
the past 120 years: “How could these 350,000 bibles meet the need of 300 million Russian people 
living now and during the past 120 years?”154 A year later, the magazine reported that “masses of 
the people [in Petrograd] are turning to the Lord . . . . Multitudes of the people who were deceived 
by the popes (priests) and dissatisfied in politics, with great thirst are crying: ‘Give us food – true 
food.’” To the fundamentalists, Russia’s political turmoil had turned its people against the 
government and the Russian Orthodox Church. To convert them to true Christianity, the magazine 
wrote, “If at the present time five hundred true preachers would come here with sufficient supply 
of the Holy Scriptures and spiritual literature, then . . . within a year a million souls would be 
converted to God.”155 
                                                 
151 George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 20. 
152 Qtd. In Molly Worthen, Apostles of Reason: The Crisis of Authority in American Evangelicalism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 21.  
153 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture, 110.  
154 “Bible Famine in Russia,” in Moody Monthly 22, no. 1 (1921):595. 
155 “Great Spiritual Hunger in Russia,” in Moody Monthly 22, no. 3 (1922): 692. 
Howard 43 
 
The focus on sola scriptura was standard in fundamentalist discussions of missions. 
William Blackstone, an early twentieth-century fundamentalist priest, hid boxes of Bibles in Petra 
printed in Hebrew, Yiddish, and Aramaic. He hoped that after the end times began, Jews would 
flee to the Palestine region, find the Bibles, realize God’s truth, and convert.156 Unlike Blackstone, 
fundamentalist discourse on Soviet Russia were not eschatological, but it shared Blackstone’s 
emphasis on sola scriptura: Scripture would show Russians God’s truth and lead them to 
conversion. Compared to mainline Protestants, fundamentalists were suspicious of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, calling it deceptive. Moreover, Protestants viewed Russians as Christians while 
fundamentalists saw them as non-Christian. One Moody Monthly advertisement for the Russian 
Missionary Society called Russia the “greatest unevangelized country.”157 Despite their different 
views of the Russian Orthodox Church and its members, mainline Protestants and fundamentalists 
believed that Russians were open to their Protestant messages and would convert with once 
American missions increased.   
Domestically, Russian Orthodox Christians in North America Americanized their churches 
by increasing the use of English and urging assimilation among its members. One example of 
Americanization was in St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York City. On February 12, 1924, the 
church offered a service in English to honor the birthday of Abraham Lincoln.158 While there is no 
connection between Lincoln and a translated Slavonic ritual, the cathedral viewed the service as 
an important step in Americanization. In a statement from the cathedral, the clergy explained the 
translated service as “the first step towards Americanization of the Orthodox Church in the United 
States, where about two million Orthodox communicants . . . have been using . . . the languages 
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used in their former mother countries.”159 To St. Nicholas Cathedral’s clergy, translated services 
were important to Americanizing Orthodoxy. Other priests pushed members to learn English for 
similar reasons. In Hartford, Connecticut, one Russian Orthodox priest begged his community to 
volunteer to teach his church’s children English so they could “become [better] citizens.”160 The 
use of English grew among children of Russian Orthodox immigrants; instead of clinging to their 
mother tongue, the next generation demanded services in English so their children and non-
Orthodox spouses could understand.161 As churches offered more translated services and more 
members learned English, they demonstrated a desire to assimilate into their North American 
context. Furthermore, the Church’s Russian qualities eroded.  
As the Church Americanized, American newspapers viewed it as distinct from the “Living 
Church,” painting the ROGCCA as an anti-Bolshevik institution. Following the Revolution, 
newspapers began portraying the “Living Church” as Soviet puppets. One 1922 newspaper article 
from the Boston Daily Globe reporting on Moscow Church calls its administrators the “red clergy” 
and accusing them of being the Soviets’ means to seize Church property, collection money, and 
other valuables from North American Orthodox churches.162 As the American press portrayed the 
“Living Church” as Soviets, it noticed the North American Orthodox institution fighting the 
“Living Church” in court. In 1925, several newspapers in the Northeast covered the story of US 
courts awarding the “Living Church” ownership of St. Nicholas Cathedral at the expense of the 
ROGCCA.163 Furthermore, they began to recognize the steps that the ROGCCA had taken to 
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separate itself from the Soviet government. In 1925, the New York Times covered the litigation as 
the result of “the Sobor at Detroit last year . . . establishing the Russian American Orthodox Church 
. . . to prevent the Soviet Government from having any control of the Russian Church in this 
country.”164 In the press, the ROGCCA became a hero – the institution fighting Bolshevik in the 
United States. In other words, it did not warrant suspicion of Bolshevik influence from the 
American public.  
Reunification Efforts between the ROGCCA and the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow 
 Despite distancing itself from the Russian Orthodox Church, the ROGCCA attempted to 
reunify with Moscow and the Old World. Initially, reconnection came through cooperation 
between the ROGCCA and the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia (ROCOR). Following 
the fall of the Russian Empire, Russian Orthodox clergy fled the country, first settling in 
Constantinople and then Serbia.165 The clergy had an experience similar to the ROGCCA. In 1922, 
after failing to establish consistent communication with Moscow, the group established a synod 
on the authority of Tikhon’s 1920 Resolutions: ROCOR. Like the abolished Holy Synod, it would 
administrate Russian Orthodoxy around the world.166 In 1926, ROCOR attempted to bring the 
North American Diocese under its control; while Platon initially cooperated, he cut ties with 
ROCOR because he viewed its support for restoration of the Russian monarchy as anachronistic 
and he thought ROCOR exaggerated its claims of authority over North America.167 For Platon and 
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the North American Diocese, ROCOR’s politics were too anachronistic and it threatened the 
ROGCCA’s autonomy.  
 After cooperation between Platon and ROCOR ended, the relationship between the 
ROGCCA and ROCOR seemed antagonistic. In response to his actions, ROCOR suspended Platon 
– but Platon and his authority remained unaffected as North American Orthodox Christians rallied 
behind him to oppose Soviet influence from the “Living Church.”168 However, after the death of 
Platon in 1934, the relationship changed. With the appointment of Platon’s successor Metropolitan 
Theolipus at the Fifth All-American Sobor, the ROGCCA sought to normalize North America’s 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. During his tenure, ROCOR, the ROGCCA, and the Church in Moscow 
claimed authority over North America; before the Russian Revolution, parallel jurisdictions in the 
Russian Orthodox Church were nonexistent.169 While Theolipus wanted to resolve the parallel 
jurisdictions, the Sobor wanted the ROGCCA to remain autonomous.170 One plan to resolve 
parallel jurisdictions that the Sobor rejected was from the Church in Moscow. Before the meeting, 
the Church in Moscow demanded American bishops pledge loyalty to the Soviet Government and 
refused to recognize the ROGCCA’s autonomy.171 Without Moscow, ROCOR became the 
alternative for the ROGCCA. At the Sixth All-American Sobor in 1937, the ROGCCA temporarily 
agreed to report to ROCOR over matters of faith as long as the ROGCCA would remain 
autonomous in administrating the diocese.172 While the arrangement was unprecedented, it showed 
that the ROGCCA sought to maintain previous forms of ecclesiastical order. Moreover, since 
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Soviets did not control ROCOR and it was a group of exiled bishops – many of whom had served 
on the Holy Synod – obeying ROCOR’s authority was the closest relationship the ROGCCA could 
establish to resemble traditional ecclesiastical order.   
 However, the relationship between ROCOR and the ROGCCA crumbled as the ROGCCA 
tried to reconnect with the Moscow Church after World War II. Between 1937 and 1945, the 
ROGCCA agreed to recognize ROCOR’s authority temporarily.173 However, the ROGCCA lost 
interest in ROCOR due to developments in Moscow. With the approval of Soviet Premier Joseph 
Stalin, Patriarch Alexis became head of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow and invited the 
ROGCCA to send a delegation to the Moscow Council of 1945.174 The ROGCCA was enthusiastic 
about this development for three reasons: First, relations between the US and Soviet Union were 
warm because of the wartime alliance.175 Second, Alexis’s tenure marked the beginning of more 
freedom for the Church in Moscow, not because of his leadership, but because Stalin allowed the 
Church to operate legally after twenty years of persecution.176 Third, with the Church in Moscow 
returning to stability, the ROGCCA could fulfill the goal of the Fourth All-American Sobor: to 
return to the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow when Soviet influence 
ended.177 With Moscow as a viable option to reconnect with and reestablish pre-Russian 
Revolution ecclesiastical order, the ROGCCA ended its temporary agreement with ROCOR and 
sent a delegation to Moscow.  
 Despite the enthusiasm for reconnecting with Moscow, negotiations fell apart and ended 
hopes of reunification. At the Council of Moscow, one issue divided the Patriarch and the 
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ROGCCA delegation: autonomy. The ROGCCA wanted an arrangement similar to the one it made 
with ROCOR: one that allowed the ROGCCA to remain autonomous.178 Alexis refused. Instead, 
he wanted to return to the relationship reestablish the ROGCCA as a diocese of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, returning administrative powers to Moscow.179 With negotiations deadlocked, 
the ROGCCA became unlikely to return under Moscow’s authority. Negotiations soured after 
opinions of Alexis worsened. One of his declarations from 1945 stipulated that the “American 
Orthodox Church [must] abstain from political activities against the USSR.”180 In light of this 
condition, the ROGCCA delegation viewed Alexis as a tool of the Soviet government and ended 
negotiations. In 1950, the Eighth All-American Sobor barely acknowledged the failed negotiation 
with Moscow; instead, the clergy resolved to build the North American Church. They drafted 
statutes to govern the ROGCCA and rebuilt the Central Church Administration.181 In the end, the 
Russian Revolution had caused too much change in the ROGCCA for it to become subservient 
under the Church in Moscow again. The ROGCCA had built its own administrative councils, held 
semi-annual meetings, and effectively practiced autonomy – leading it to refuse any relationship 
with Moscow that did not allow its independence to continue.  
Conclusion 
 The Russian Revolution was the force behind autonomy for Russian Orthodox Christians 
in North America. By disconnecting them from Moscow, the Revolution forced Russian Orthodox 
Christians to become self-reliant. They had to administrate their own affairs, raise their own 
money, and manage affairs with foreign churches. In the broader context of the United States, the 
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Russian Revolution caused the First Red Scare. While one might think the Revolution increased 
antagonism between Americans and Russian Orthodox Christians, newspapers from the era 
suggest that Americans recognized the role Russian Orthodox Christians played in opposing 
Bolshevik influence in the US. The juxtaposition between the atheistic Bolshevik seizing church 
lands and property from the devout Russian Orthodox Christian immigrant helped differentiate the 
groups to the American public – and made Orthodox Christians more acceptable to American 
society. Some Americans viewed Russians as fit for democracy because they were Christian. 
Protestants viewed Russians as potential converts. Russian Orthodox Christians were more 
interested in spreading their faith than converting to Protestantism. However, the Russian 
Revolution harmed the American mission, forcing Russian Orthodox Christians to navigate 
American society rather than remain outside it with the help of the Church in Moscow.   
 Immigration and assimilation were only parts of the story of Russian Orthodox Christianity 
in North America during the early twentieth century. The Russian Revolution undid centuries-old 
ecclesiastical order and led North American Orthodox Christians into unknown territory. Without 
contact to Moscow, they had to administrate themselves – deviating from the relationship between 
diocese and the patriarch. They elected archbishops and metropolitans without higher authority, 
and used the All-American Sobors and Tikhon’s resolutions to justify their actions. Whether their 
actions obeyed Orthodox canonical law or Tikhon’s resolutions was debatable; nonetheless, what 
mattered were the ways in which the Russian Revolution compromised established ecclesiastical 
order. The North American Diocese navigated isolation from the Church in Moscow by justifying 
its actions with Tikhon’s resolutions. In the context of Orthodox history, the North American 
Diocese demonstrated how Orthodox dioceses could operate under temporary autonomy while 
disconnected from its patriarch.   
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After choosing to remain disconnected from Moscow, the ROGCCA weakened its ties to 
the Old World. After World War II, the ROGCCA again led North American Orthodoxy into 
unknown territory towards the formation of an autocephalous Orthodox Church of North America. 
However, challenges to autocephaly emerged. The ROGCCA had to navigate America’s religious 
landscape, particularly its postwar rise of religious observance, ecumenicalism, New Age 
Spiritualism, and the Charismatic Revival. In doing so, the ROGCCA defined its Orthodox identity 
















Chapter Two, Orthodox Witness: The Orthodox Church in America, and the Ecumenical 
Movement in Postwar America 
Introduction 
In August 1948, Alexander Schmemann, one of the preeminent Orthodox theologians of the 
twentieth century, joined Protestants and Orthodox Christians in Amsterdam, Netherlands at the 
First Assembly of the World Council of Churches (WCC). The assembly was the culmination of 
decades of ecumenical work from Christians around the world. Schmemann later called this 
moment his “ecumenical baptism.”182 Unlike their Orthodox predecessors, whom Protestants 
invited as observers to ecumenical conferences, Schmemann and his colleagues were members of 
the WCC. However, Schmemann’s experience at the WCC’s First Assemble revealed an inherent 
problem in the assumptions of the Protestant ecumenical movement. Upon his arrival to the 
assembly, a “high ecumenical dignitary . . . informed [him] that the Orthodox delegates would be 
seated at the extreme right of the assembly hall together with representatives of the Western ‘high 
churches.’”183 Schmemann, unfamiliar with the meaning of “high churches”, asked the dignitary 
to explain the seating arrangement: “His answer was that it simply reflected the ecclesiological 
makeup of the conference, one of those main themes would be precisely the dichotomy of the 
‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ ideas of the Church.”184 
This interaction made Schmemann reevaluate the relationship between Eastern Orthodoxy 
and the ecumenical movement. In response to the dignitary’s explanation, Schmemann said that 
he would prefer “a seat to the extreme ‘left’ with the Quakers, whose emphasis on the Holy Spirit 
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we Orthodox certainly share.”185 While Schmemann believed that non-Orthodox Christians fit 
Orthodoxy incorrectly into their ecclesiology, he thought their misunderstandings reflected the 
problem of the ecumenical movement. In 1976, in an article titled “The Ecumenical Agony,” he 
explained that “The important fact of Orthodox participation in the ecumenical movement . . . is 
precisely that the Orthodox were not given a choice; that from the very beginning they were 
assigned, not only to seats but a certain place, role, and function within the ecumenical 
movement.”186 Besides lacking freedom within the movement, Schmemann felt that the 
ecumenical movement inherently excluded Orthodoxy:  
These ‘assignments’ were based on Western theological and ecclesiological 
presuppositions and categories. . . . We were caught in the essentially Western 
dichotomies – Catholic versus Protestant, horizontal versus vertical, authority 
versus freedom, hierarchical versus congregational.187 
This chapter is a study of the Orthodox Church in America and its engagement with the 
American religious landscape after World War II. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the OCA’s 
relationship with the WCC. Moreover, it examines what OCA leaders thought of the ecumenical 
movement and the WCC through the writings of John Meyendorff and Schmemann. It contrasts 
Orthodox and Protestant views of ecumenism – emphasizing how their ideas of ecumenism 
conflicted. This chapter also reflects on the position of the OCA in the ecumenical movement. 
Because the Church received autocephaly from the Russian Orthodox Church rather than an 
ecumenical council, other Orthodox Churches did not recognize the OCA’s authority and excluded 
it from ecumenical dialogues – especially those after the Cold War.188 As a result, this chapter is 
an examination on Orthodox-Protestant ecumenism through the WCC from 1950 to 1980. This 
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chapter also asks why Meyendorff and Schmemann supported keeping the church in organizations 
like the WCC despite their criticisms of the ecumenical movement. Additionally, it is important to 
contextualize their writings. Schmemann and Meyendorff wrote during the neo-Patristic synthesis, 
a movement that sought to distance Orthodoxy from Western thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas. 
To do so, Orthodox scholars researched Church Fathers and used their writings in theological 
discourse. As Schmemann and Meyendorff detested Western Christianity for its Western “thought 
forms,” they were partially referring to this division between Eastern and Western Christian 
scholarship.189 Lastly, this chapter examines the opinions of non-OCA Orthodox Christians on 
ecumenism. In doing so, this chapter reveals how OCA leaders differed from other Orthodox 
Christians in their understanding of Orthodoxy’s position within American society and anxieties 
over secular influence from America.  
To address these topics, this chapter asks how Orthodox Christians and Protestants 
understood ecumenism. How did their definitions develop over the twentieth century? What were 
both groups’ experiences with ecumenism before they engaged in it with each other? Moreover, 
how did their definitions of ecumenism resonate and conflict with one another? Did their conflicts 
reflect different expectations of the ecumenical movement? Lastly, why did OCA leaders support 
ecumenism despite their dissatisfaction with the movement?      
Ultimately, this chapter argues that tensions arose between Meyendorff, Schmemann, and 
Protestant concepts of ecumenism because of their conflicting goals. Meyendorff and Schmemann 
believed ecumenism should be a vehicle to evangelize the non-Orthodox – a view developed from 
Anglican-Orthodox conferences in Western Europe and the teachings of Metropolitan Evlogy. 
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Protestants shared a similar view before World War II, with ecumenical organizations funding and 
coordinating missions to convert non-Protestants in European colonies. With the end of 
imperialism and the influence of William Temple and Willem Visser t’ Hooft, Protestants 
abandoned their evangelistic aims and viewed ecumenism as a means to facilitate cooperation 
among Christians and find common beliefs across Christian traditions. This understanding of 
ecumenism guided the WCC during the mid-twentieth century, leading Meyendorff and 
Schmemann to reevaluate Orthodoxy’s relationship with the ecumenical movement. Meyendorff 
and Schmemann continued to accept ecumenism as a way to convert the non-Orthodox, believing 
that Protestants had distorted its meaning. To overcome this problem, Schmemann believed 
Orthodox Christians needed to recommit themselves to their faith to show the non-Orthodox the 
truth of Orthodoxy. Conversely, Meyendorff urged Orthodox Christian to participate in the 
ecumenical movement so the non-Orthodox could realize the truth of Orthodoxy and restore 
ecumenism to its correct meaning.   
 The topic for this chapter emerged from conversations I had with Orthodox clergy and laity 
inside and outside the OCA. These conversations revealed a tension between Orthodoxy and 
ecumenism. Anthony Roeber, a professor at St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary, said the “OCA 
is interested and participates” in ecumenical organizations.190 He viewed ecumenism as a counter 
to “isolationism” within the Orthodox Church – by which he meant the Church’s avoidance of 
engaging Western Christians in dialogue.191 However, he stressed the importance of enforcing 
theological boundaries: For example, the OCA would not agree on doctrine with conservative 
evangelicals were also unlikely because of their “lack of liturgy.”192 The only traditions that 
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Roeber believed could unify with Eastern Orthodoxy were Oriental Orthodox Churches.193 
Ecumenism opened the OCA to other Christian traditions, but OCA clergy prioritized enforcing 
theological boundaries – limiting the relationships the church could form with Protestant traditions.  
Few scholars have investigated this tension. Nicolas Zernov explained Orthodox 
participation as political: OCA leaders wanted a unified, worldwide, Christian effort against Soviet 
repression of Orthodoxy.194 Zernov also provided a helpful explanation for why the ecumenical 
movement dissatisfied Orthodox Christians: they believed that other Christians should “accept as 
revealed truth the teaching of the Church.”195 In other words, ecumenism meant more than 
cooperation between Christians – it meant unity under the Orthodox Church. Although Zernov 
provided a helpful framework for understanding Orthodox Christians and the ecumenical 
movement, he published works during the mid-twentieth century. In other words, his works do not 
examine the opinions of OCA leaders to the ecumenical movement after they had participated in 
the movement for decades. This chapter uses these later works to discuss OCA dissatisfaction with 
ecumenism in the late twentieth century.  
This chapter uses many primary sources to establish the opinions of ecumenism in 
Orthodoxy and Protestantism. To establish the Protestant ideas, this chapter uses the works of two 
ecumenical leaders: John Raleigh Motts, leader of the World Student Christian Association and 
Willem Visser t’ Hooft, the first president of the WCC.  This chapter also uses the works of 
Alexander Schmemann and John Meyendorff. Before coming to America, these Orthodox 
theologians witnessed ecumenism through Anglican-Orthodox conferences, an experience that 
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informed their views of the ecumenical movement. Both served as professors and deans of St. 
Vladimir’s Theological Seminary from 1962 to 1983 and 1984 to 1992, respectively. Their tenures 
represented three decades of leadership and instruction over generations of American Orthodox 
clergy.196 St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary’s also continues to teach courses on their 
theology.197 Additionally, they were prominent in public discussions of Orthodoxy, with 
Meyendorff editing multiple OCA publications and Schmemann works being translated into 
multiple languages.198   
To examine these authors’ writings, the OCA, and ecumenism, this chapter follows the 
ecumenical movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – explaining why 
Protestants abandoned their evangelist goals as imperialism ended. Then, the chapter recounts 
Orthodox involvement in the ecumenical movement before World War II to understand how 
Orthodox Christians developed different understandings of ecumenism. Following these 
explanations, the chapter examines the writings of Meyendorff and Schmemann, developing their 
critiques of the ecumenical movement and Western civilization.    
Ecumenism in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries 
To understand the ideas of ecumenism that Schmemann and Meyendorff reacted to, it is important 
to trace the roots of the ecumenical movement. The ecumenical and missions movements emerged 
from the Social Gospel Movement. In late nineteenth century, Protestants witnessed a changing 
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America. America became more urbanized as immigration increased American cities’ populations. 
Industrialization drew immigrants to American cities, and exacerbated income inequality and poor 
urban living conditions. These social changes coincided with developments in American 
Protestantism. Following the Second Great Awakening, liberal Protestants believed that they had 
a responsibility in an industrialized, urbanized, and rapidly changing world to apply Christian 
values and societal problems to improve the world.199 Proponent of the Social Gospel Walter 
Rauschenbusch captured this Protestant social ethic in his book A Theology of the Social Gospel: 
“We [Social Gospel activists] cannot stand for poor and laborious people being deprived of 
physical stature, youth, education, human equality, and justice, in order to enable others to live 
luxurious lives.”200 
 Following the Social Gospel, Protestants formed organizations to address society’s 
problems. In the 1860s, after witnessing the squalor of East London slums, William Booth founded 
the Christian Revival Society – an organization that became the Salvation Army.201 However, his 
organization did not address only social issues. Rather, Social Gospel advocates fused social and 
evangelistic outreach.202 For example, while Booth addressed the problems of urbanization by 
helping the poor, he also preached the gospel.203 There were two theological reasons for combining 
social and evangelistic efforts. First, leaders of the Second Great Awakening taught that God 
bestowed upon everyone the ability to come to Christ.204 As Charles Finney preached in 1837, 
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“Simply believing what God has revealed on any point, is an act of faith; but justifying faith fastens 
[a believer] on Christ, takes hold of his atonement, and embraces him as the only ground of pardon 
and salvation.”205 The doctrine of general atonement, as opposed to the Calvinist view that only 
the elect would be saved, reoriented the path to salvation. In the First Great Awakening, priests 
taught that God was sovereign over all things, including salvation.206 After the Second Great 
Awakening, salvation depended on the individual’s acceptance of Christ. As Social Gospel 
activists helped the urban poor, they preached that the best way to improve their condition was to 
convert. As Rauschenbusch explained about the role of salvation in the Social Gospel Movement, 
“the salvation of the individual is . . . an essential part.”207  
However, Social Gospel activists’ concerns over salvation expanded beyond the individual. 
Their second theological reason for fusing evangelistic and social outreach was postmillennialism.  
As George Marsden explained,  
To postmillenialists, prophecies in the book of Revelation concerning the defeat of 
the anti-Christ . . . were being fulfilled in the present era, and were clearing the way 
for a golden age. This ‘millenium’ . . . would be the last epoch of the present 
historical age . . . . Christ would return after this millennial age . . . and would bring 
history to an end.208   
Under a postmillennialist view, improving society progressed the world towards the Kingdom of 
God. This interpretation of history explained contemporary developments in global affairs. In 
Europe and the Mediterranean, the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Papacy proved that 
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Christ was conquering the forces of evil.209 Poor relief and witnessing to urban masses progressed 
society towards the Kingdom of God and prepared nonbelievers for Christ’s return.  
 Besides theological motivations, Protestants worried about Protestant cultural hegemony. 
In the late nineteenth century, immigration from Ireland and Italy increased Catholicism’s presence 
in the United States.210 Protestant anxiety over Catholicism expanded beyond their ethnic 
differences. Catholic immigrants tried to assimilate into American society as Cardinal Gibbons 
and Archbishop John Ireland prevented Catholic parishes from dividing by nationality and had 
priests deliver services in English.211 Nonetheless, Protestants grew anxious that Catholics would 
control American institutions and expose it to their “popish” corruptions.212 This anxiety echoed 
anti-Catholic prejudice that Catholics could not participate in a liberal democracy because of their 
obedience to the Pope.213 In 1837, Protestant leader Alexander Campbell asserted that Catholics 
were incapable of “freedom of thought” and that the “benumbing and paralyzing influence of 
Romanism is such, as to disqualify a person or the relish and enjoyment of political liberty.”214 In 
American public schools, teachers reinforced this idea by conflating Protestantism and 
republicanism – implying that to fit into American democracy, one must be Protestant.215   
 Challenges to Protestant hegemony grew as Catholics pushed back against Protestantism’s 
influence. Catholic leaders pushed back against the conflation of Protestantism and 
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republicanism.216 In response, public school officials made the curriculum more secular.217 As 
Catholics pushed Protestantism out of public spaces, Protestants formed ecumenical bodies. These 
organizations included the Evangelical Alliance, the Young Men’s and Young Women’s Christian 
Association (YMCA), Christian Endeavor, the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF), 
missionary agencies, and worldwide fellowships with Methodists, Baptists, and Reformed 
Protestants.218 Ecumenism overcame theological differences that historically divided Protestant 
sects, creating a unified front to coordinate efforts against Catholics. One such effort was the 
Temperance Movement. Temperance activists tied drunkenness to the Social Gospel. Alcohol 
consumption represented society’s problems: immoral behavior, neglecting one’s family, and 
unemployment.219 Activists also tied temperance to anti-immigrant sentiment, signaling that 
drinkers were Catholics – or, in the Protestants eyes, irreligious.220  
By the early twentieth century, ecumenism had emerged from the Second Great 
Awakening, the Social Gospel Movement, and anti-Catholicism. While many Protestant leaders 
led efforts to improve American society and protect Protestant hegemony, others looked abroad. 
Their goals were similar to the domestically focused organizations: improve society, evangelize, 
and support Protestant dominance. One Protestant leader who led these efforts was John Raleigh 
Mott. During his youth, Mott had been part of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign 
Missions. The organization’s founder Arthur Tappan Pierson recruited Mott, sharing with Mott his 
view of mission work.221 As Pierson wrote in his book, The Crisis of Missions, missions were a 
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“duty” that God commanded Christians to perform.222 Through missions, God transforms “whole 
communities” through his “grace” and “divine spirit.”223 In the late nineteenth century, when Mott 
became leader of the YMCA and the WSCF, he had traveled around the world evangelizing non-
Christians.224 Mott’s influence over missions and the ecumenical movement grew as he presided 
over the 1910 Edinburgh Missionary Conference – the formal beginning of the Protestant Christian 
ecumenical movement.225 
In 1900, Mott outlined his view of ecumenism in his book The Evangelization of the World 
in This Generation. According to Mott, ecumenism allowed Christians “to give all men an 
adequate opportunity to know Jesus Christ as their Savior and to become His real disciples.”226 
This idea connected missions and ecumenism. As Mott wrote, Protestants had an “equal burden of 
responsibility for the world’s evangelization” because Christ commanded it through the Great 
Commission.227 The best way to share this “burden” was through interdenominational mission 
efforts. Throughout the late twentieth century, Protestants had formed inter-denominational 
organizations such as the WSCF.228 In contrast, during the nineteenth century, Protestants mostly 
coordinated missions within their denominations. For example, the American Home Missionary 
Society supported Presbyterian missions.229 To Mott, denominational mission agencies prevented 
Protestants from equally sharing the “burden” of missions; moreover, denominational mission 
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agencies were counterintuitive because Protestants shared “the aim of preaching the Gospel where 
Christ has not been named.”230    
 Initially, the view that sharing the goal of evangelizing non-Christians justified ecumenical 
missions seemed to ignore theological difference. However, Mott was advocating for ecumenical 
missions for Protestants exclusively. His view of missions reflected a Protestant understanding of 
conversion. According to him, an important part of missions was “circulating the printed Scriptures 
and other Christian literature.”231 This view resonated with Protestantism’s belief in sola scriptura. 
By reading Scripture, non-Christians would realize the truth of Christianity and convert. In 
contrast, Catholics and Orthodox Christians view their churches and sacraments as the means to 
salvation.232 Moreover, Mott emphasized the importance of making Scripture and sermons 
accessible to non-Christians:  
The Gospel must be preached in such a manner as will constitute an intelligent and 
intelligible presentation of the message. This necessitates on the part of the preacher 
such a knowledge of the language, the habits of thought and the moral conditions 
of those who are to be evangelized as will understand what is said.233 
By preaching in foreign languages and adapting to social contexts, non-Christians could 
understand the Gospel and its truths and receive salvation through Scripture.  
Besides ecumenical mission organizations and sola scriptura, Mott tied imperialism to 
evangelism. According to Mott, evangelism and imperialism were harmonious for two reasons: 
First, imperialism gave Christians access to non-Christians by expanding into foreign territories. 
As a result, missionaries could “Christianize” the world.234 Second, imperialism supported early 
                                                 
230 Mott, The Evangelization of the World, 2-16. 
231 Ibid, 5. 
232 Peter Bouteneff, “Christ and Salvation” in The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology, eds. 
Mary B. Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 104. 
233 Mott, The Evangelization of the World, 6. 
234 Ibid, 4.  
Howard 63 
 
Christian missions. To support this point, Mott cited the stories of the apostles. According to him, 
the Roman Empire gave the apostles access to “barbarous nations” through infrastructure and 
insured their safety through Roman law; moreover, the empire gathered previously rural people in 
cities, making proselytizing easier for the apostles.235 Additionally, the Roman Empire had 
“prepared people for Christianity” by “civilizing” them with Greek philosophy.236 In reality, the 
Roman Empire persecuted early Christians; however, ignoring this fact fit into “civilizing mission” 
– the idea that imperialism modernized colonies by infusing rationality, reason, and Enlightenment 
principles into their society and culture.237 By ignoring the persecution of early Christians and the 
atrocities of contemporary empires, Mott maintained that imperialism benefited colonies by 
“civilizing” them with Christianity.  
Mott’s views became prominent in the ecumenical movement. In the reports of the 1910 
World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh, one can see how attendees connected imperialism, 
ecumenism, and evangelism. One resolution of the conference declared the goal of ecumenism as, 
“The evangelization of nations, the Christianizing of empires and kingdoms.”238 To support this 
resolution, the assembly explained that, 
The non-Christian world is awakening. . . . These awakening nations are looking to 
the West for intellectual enlightenment and for civilization. To give them this 
without religion would be to give them that which must prove them a curse and not 
a blessing. The Christian religion has supplied what is distinctively good in western 
civilization, and can alone correct its many evils. That religion alone . . . can meet 
the need of these awakening nations and make their influence powerful for good.239 
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This resolution resonated with the civilizing mission. Under imperialism, Protestants believed that 
colonized people yearned for Western civilization, which included Christianity. To civilize 
colonies, Protestant needed to unite and send missionaries needed to evangelize.  
 Between World War I and II, some Protestants departed from Mott’s view imperialism 
supporting ecumenism and evangelism. This departure was due to their disillusionment with 
imperialism. With the end of colonization, Protestants (who began to call themselves liberals, or 
modernists) became increasingly aware of the antagonism that colonized people held towards 
imperialism. Pearl Buck, a Christian missionary in China, found herself denounced as an 
“American cultural imperialist” by the Chinese during the Cultural Revolution.240 Buck and other 
Protestants adopted critiques of imperialism, including members of the WSCF. WSCF member 
Madathilparampil Mammem Thomas believed that “nationalist blindness” hindered Protestants 
from seeing how imperialism harmed colonies.241 However, Protestants mainly worried that 
imperialism had led to communism – placing colonies under totalitarian, secular governments and 
hindering Protestants’ ecumenical crusade.242   
 In response to decolonization, some Protestants sought a “third way” between the West 
and the Soviet Union. They no longer viewed ecumenism as a means to “civilizing” non-
Christians. As Hooft wrote in a 1931 editorial in the ecumenical journal Student World, Protestants 
should avoid aggravating cultural and national differences that distract from “God’s power in life 
and word” and lead people into communism.243 However, Hooft avoided arguing that Protestants 
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should not evangelize. Later, in his book No Other Name: The Choice between Syncretism and 
Christian Universalism, he detested the view  
that holds that there is no unique revelation in history, that there are many 
different ways to reach the divine reality, that all formulations of religious truth or 
experience are by their very nature inadequate expressions of that truth and that it 
is necessary to harmonize as much as possible all religious ideas and experiences 
so to create one universal religion for mankind. 244 
Although Hooft accepted differences between cultures and nations, he did not support relativism 
– or that all knowledge depends on culture, society, and historical context. He believed that there 
was still one truth: Christianity. Missionaries should proselytize, but respect cultural and social 
differences. 
 Furthermore, Hooft made room for non-Protestants in the ecumenical movement. 
Previously, Protestants invited Orthodox Christians and Catholics to observe ecumenical 
conferences. However, Hooft recognized that to combat communism, the ecumenical movement 
needed the participation of Christians under its rule – particularly the Orthodox.245 As a result, he 
defined the goal of ecumenism as the facilitation of “unity in Christ” and the transformation of 
“churches into that Church universal.”246 To create a universal church required “acts of unity” and 
“overcoming our divisions.”247 In other words, Hooft needed Christians to overlook their 
theological differences. To do so, Hooft echoed an idea developed by William Temple, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, who advocated for a universal church based on “common belief.”248 
Temple never specified what beliefs Christians shared, so Hooft suggested unity through the 
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doctrine “that Christ is the savior.”249 In matters of differing doctrines, traditions, or liturgy, Hooft 
argued that no tradition has a “monopoly” on truth, but the shared belief in Christ offered 
Christians a reason to unify as communism spread in the postcolonial world.250 
 The First Assembly of the WCC reflected Hooft’s ideas on ecumenism. The assembly’s 
reports began with a declaration supporting its commitment to Christ and His Church: “the Church 
is God’s gift to men for the salvation of earth; that the saving acts of God in Jesus Christ brought 
the Church into being.”251 Besides the importance of Christ, the assembly discussed no other 
doctrinal matters. Instead, it laid out four points of discussion: First, “Why is it that Christians 
have such different interpretations of the one faith, and find it so hard to understand one another?”; 
second, “How is the message of the Gospel to be made real to [people in non-Christian 
countries]?”; third, “Are criticisms of the church ‘justified?,’” and fourth, “What can Christians do 
when their ‘loyalty to Christ’ conflicts with their ‘loyalty to [their] country.’”252 
The First Assembly echoed Mott’s concern for Christian missions. It maintained his focus 
of making the Gospel available to everyone, but the language of mission discussion had Protestant 
assumptions; the document assumed that making Scripture available to non-Christians would 
convert them. The First Assembly avoided Mott’s imperialist language. The First Assembly 
reflected Hooft’s idea of universalism. It identified common beliefs among attendees: “the Church 
is God’s gift to men for the salvation of earth; that the saving acts of God in Jesus Christ brought 
the Church into being; that the Church persists in continuity throughout history through the 
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presence and the power of the Holy Spirit.”253 To Hooft, the Assembly did not advocate for mixing 
traditions – or syncretism – although conservative Protestant missionaries believed that cultural 
accommodation was another form of syncretism. The First Assembly also echoed Temple’s idea 
of Christian cooperation and open dialogue – not to reconcile doctrinal difference – but to 
understand differences and find common beliefs.  
Orthodoxy and the Ecumenical Movement 
 Although Orthodox Christians were uninvolved in the developments of the ecumenical 
movement in America, they had ecumenical interactions with Protestants before joining the WCC. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, ecumenical encounters between Orthodoxy and Protestantism 
mainly occurred through the Anglican Church. During the mid-1800s, some Anglican leaders of 
the Oxford movement propagated the branch theory – an idea that the Greek, Latin, and English 
churches constituted three branches of the one, true church.254 Anglican deacon William Palmer 
wanted to convince the Orthodox Church that Anglicanism and Orthodoxy represented branches 
of the same religion. In 1840, he traveled to Russia where members of the Holy Synod received 
him. To Palmer’s dismay, officials of the Russian church found his religion too Protestant, 
particularly because of his belief in filioque.255 Palmer also found that Orthodox Christians wanted 
to remain separate from the West, as they believed the schism had protected the East from heresy.  
Later Anglican leaders tried to appeal to Russian Church officials, not by claiming the two 
religions were the same, but that the Anglican Church had the truth but Orthodoxy was the true 
“catholic” church descended from the apostles. One of these leaders, J. J. Overbeck, submitted a 
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petition to the Holy Synod 1860, asking it to establish an Orthodox Catholic Church of the West 
so members could enter the Orthodox Church. The Synod received the petition, but Orthodox 
officials ignored the request.256 The only successful Anglican-Orthodox association was the 
Eastern Churches Association (ECA), founded by Anglican author John Mason Neale and Russian 
chaplain Evgenii Popov.257 Unlike his predecessors who sought recognition and reconciliation 
from Eastern Churches, Neale focused on educating Anglicans in Orthodoxy. He translated 
Eastern liturgies into English. The ECA also educated Anglicans about the Eastern Church, 
facilitated intercommunion with the Orthodox Church, and raised funds for interfaith 
discussions.258  
Orthodox clergy were more receptive to the ECA because of its efforts to learn from 
Orthodoxy – rather than equate it with Anglicanism. The ECA continued to grow over the next 
century. In 1890, Metropolitan Evlogy served as the president of the ECA’s St. Petersburg 
chapter.259 In 1906, Anglo-Catholics merged with the ECA to found the Anglican and Eastern 
Orthodox Church Union, restoring communion between the Anglo-Catholic and Anglican 
churches and continuing their exploration of eastern traditions. 260 
Despite the success of the ECA, some Orthodox theologians remained skeptical of 
Anglican-Orthodox ecumenism. N. N. Damalas, a professor at the University of Athens, criticized 
Anglicanism’s 39 Thirty-nine Articles of Faith, specifically its inclusion of the filioque and 
conflicting ideas of justification and original sin.261 Despite the criticisms of Orthodox theologians, 
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Anglicans and Orthodox held the Third Lambeth Conference in 1888. The intent of the conference 
was to reconcile differences of faith, which it accomplished to a limited degree. Anglicans and 
Orthodox Christians agreed upon the importance of Scripture as God’s word, the validity of the 
Nicene Creeds, the power of Baptism and the Eucharist in salvation, and that the Holy Episcopate 
varied on “needs of other nations and people.”262 Anglicans and Orthodox especially united over 
shared antagonism towards the Roman Catholic Church. 
The developments of the Third Lambeth Conference revealed a pattern in Anglican-
Orthodox relationships: Anglicans position themselves against Catholicism and emphasize the 
importance of liturgy in their Church and their shared history with Orthodoxy. In the American 
Orthodox newsletter The Living Church, Anglican preacher Francis J. Hall argued against the 
notion that Anglicanism was opposed to Orthodoxy. In his article titled “The Church and the East,” 
Hall insisted that the Church of England was not a new Church from the sixteenth century, 
although King Henry VIII founded it during the Reformation. Instead, it existed in continuity from 
the first Seven Ecumenical Councils and emerged as a “revolt [against] papal corruptions” and 
“Protestantism; a reactionary and one-sided system.”263 Hall also emphasized the “conservative 
element” of Anglicanism that differentiated it from Protestantism: the importance of liturgy and 
church institutions in administrating sacraments.264 He added that any problems in Anglicanism’s 
liturgy were “Romish excrescences,” and that Anglicans actively evaluated their practices for 
error.265 Ultimately, Orthodoxy and Anglicanism were the most similar Christian traditions 
because they respected the first Seven Ecumenical Councils and followed Christianity’s original 
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“principles and practices.”266 Therefore, there was no “justification to constitute a rupture of 
communion.”267   
As Metropolitan of Western Europe, Evlogy remained open to ecumenical dialogue with 
Anglicans. However, the interactions were one-sided. He and his peers perceived Anglican-
Orthodox relationships as Anglicans learning from Orthodoxy. This perception continued as 
Evlogy confronted the Orthodox diaspora crisis after the Russian Revolution. He saw the 
immigration of exiled Orthodox priests and laity as an opportunity for Western civilization. He 
advocated for relationships and dialogues between Russians and Western Christians: “I would also 
wish that our foreign friends, who represent western Christians should find their way to this 
community . . . may this Church be a place where everyone may grow closer together, where all 
Christians may share fraternal love.”268 Furthermore, St. Serguis’s Theological Nicholas Zernov, 
a Russian émigré in Western Europe, argued for Evlogy’s diocese to become the center of 
ecumenical gatherings. Other emigres echoed this belief. One of Evlogy’s priests, Georges 
Florosky, encouraged Western Christians to “retradition” – discover a once common, forgotten 
path.269 To facilitate contacts between Western and Orthodox Christians, Zernov began the 
Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Serguis in 1920 – and ecumenical society in which Schmemann 
and Meyendorff were a part.270 The society was the center of ecumenical dialogue in Paris.271 
Evlogy on ecumenism. “Orthodox liturgy is also an effective agent of mission, and many first are 
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attracted by and then become committed to the Orthodox Church through the richness, power, and 
sheer beauty of the worship.”272  
By the time the OCA joined the WCC in 1948, the Orthodox and liberal Protestants 
advocated for two different types of ecumenism. The one advanced by Mott, Hooft, and liberal 
Protestants initially sought to evangelize non-Protestants, tying ecumenism to missions and 
imperialism. Later, Protestants pursued Christian unity under a common belief in the holiness of 
Jesus Christ to combat communism. They also avoided doctrinal differences to prevent schism. 
The other form of ecumenism emerged from Anglican-Orthodox interactions. Anglicans initiated 
contact with Orthodox Christians, leading to an ecumenical relationship in which Anglicans 
learned from Orthodoxy. 
Given the different forms of ecumenism that Schmemann and Meyendorff experienced 
versus that of Hooft and the WCC, it seems odd that the OCA joined the ecumenical movement. 
However, the movement offered several reasons for their participation. In August 1948, the 
Moscow Patriarch sent a letter stating that he would “not authorize the presence of any 
representative at the Amsterdam Assembly either as a delegate or as an observer” due to the 
WCC’s criticisms against the Soviet Union.273 The OCA could participate without fear of Soviet 
influence. Additionally, OCA membership increased Orthodox influence in the WCC as many 
other Orthodox Churches joined, including the Greeks, the Russian Diocese of Paris, and the 
Syrians.274 In 1976, Meyendorff wrote that the WCC was appealing because it did not bind 
members to shared theology or intercommunion: “Thus, the Orthodox could be members without 
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tampering . . . with their belief that the Orthodox Church is indeed the ‘one, holy, apostolic, 
catholic and apostolic church.’”275 OCA clergy could coordinate “social, charitable, and 
educational efforts” and advance Christianity in “an increasingly secularized and atheistic 
world.”276 Lastly, the WCC was an opportunity to “witness the truth of Christ” to non-Orthodox 
Christians.277 
Alexander Schmemann, the Problems with Ecumenism and the West, and the Path to Liturgical 
Renewal   
In 1977, Schmemann published a book titled The Historical Road to Eastern Orthodoxy. He ended 
it with the Russian Revolution, writing,  
On the historic road of Orthodoxy [,] the Russian Chapter is now of course the final 
one, the last. Here Orthodoxy once more became history and was recognized as a 
way and a task, a creative inspiration for life. The way seems cut off, and in 
persecution and the blood of martyrs [,] a new chapter in the history of the Orthodox 
Church is beginning.278  
He titled this section “Tragic halt,” signifying the Soviets forcing Orthodoxy from its “Eastern 
isolation” and into the West.279 According to Schmemann, the West’s ideologies challenged the 
foundations of Orthodox thought. Modernism was the biggest threat because it “[rejected] the past 
and [accepted] ‘modernity,’ ‘science,’ or [the] ‘needs of the current moment’ as its sole 
criterion.”280 Western thought was inconsistent and did not find meaning in the past or through 
tradition as Orthodoxy did.  
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 Schmemann supported the ecumenical movement because he saw its potential to 
evangelize the non-Orthodox, but this excerpt revealed his worries about interactions with Western 
civilization – including the WCC. He levied his charge that Western thought was fundamentally 
antithetical to Orthodoxy against ecumenism by citing his “ecumenical baptism” at the First 
Assembly of the World Council of Churches. To Schmemann, the organizers decision to seat the 
Orthodox attendees at the “extreme right of the assembly hall” to represent the “horizontal” nature 
of the Orthodox Church revealed the flaws of the “Western mindset.”281 The “Western mindset” 
was the “presupposition that the Western experience, theological categories, and thought forms 
are universal.”282 Because of their limited perspectives, Western Christians had embedded a 
“framework and terms of reference for the entire ecumenical endeavor” that excluded 
Orthodoxy.283  
Schmemann’s criticisms of the WCC reveal a tension in his writing about ecumenism. 
Schmemann believed that the ecumenical movement excluded Orthodox Christians, but he never 
cited specific examples of the WCC Assembly choosing topics that disqualified Orthodox 
Christians’ opinions. Some assemblies chose topics tailored for Orthodox perspectives. For 
example, the Second Assembly discussed the relationship between the WCC and communism, 
with the council condemning the “inherent danger of [being] Christians” under a communist 
regime.284 Furthermore, Orthodox Christians were interested in the WCC, with twenty-three 
Orthodox Churches joining the organization in 1961.285  
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In his story of his “ecumenical baptism,” Schmemann referenced “Catholic versus 
Protestant, horizontal versus vertical, authority versus freedom, hierarchical versus 
congregational” as the dichotomies he thought excluded Orthodox Christians from ecumenism, 
but he did not detail how they influenced the WCC beyond a seating arrangement.286 In reality, 
Schmemann’s frustration came from the topics the WCC did not discuss. He hinted at what issues 
he wanted the WCC to confront: the West’s “deviation from and mutilation of the once common 
faith and tradition.”287 In other words, Schmemann wanted to discuss the problems of the Great 
Schism: papal primacy, the filioque, and the cessation of communication between the Catholic and 
Orthodox Churches.288  
The problem with the WCC was it would never discuss these issues because of the 
“Western mindset.” As Schmemann explained, Orthodox objections to Western Christianity were 
unimportant to Western Christians: “The West had long ago lost almost completely any awareness 
of being just the half of the initial Christianitas.”289 Western Christians cared more about 
theological issues that arose from the Protestant Reformation.290 Schmemann’s view reflected an 
Orthodox understanding of history. Western Christians broke from true Christianity in the Great 
Schism. Catholics and Protestants groups were separate from the true faith. To return to the Church 
of God, Western Christians needed to reconcile their differences with the Orthodox Church – not 
each other.291 However, because of Western Christians’ isolation from the East, Schmemann 
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believed that they “remembered not [their] separation from the East but [their] own tradition’s 
fragmentation into Catholic and Protestant camps.”292 Ecumenical organizations would never 
confront the issues of the Great Schism because Western Christians focused more on reconciling 
Protestantism and Catholicism.  
Schmemann’s assessment of ecumenical organizations relied on two false assumptions. 
First, he believed that ecumenism would never lead Catholics and Orthodox Christians to discuss 
their theological differences. However, in 1964, Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras I met in 
Jerusalem and rescinded the excommunications of 1054.293 Popes and Patriarchates continued to 
meet throughout the late twentieth century, releasing joint statements on sacraments and the path 
to full communion.294 Second, Schmemann assumed that Protestants and Catholics wanted to 
reconcile through ecumenism. Although liberal Protestants welcomed Catholics into the WCC as 
observers, the Catholic Church never joined the organization. Moreover, conservative evangelicals 
avoided the WCC’s ecumenism because they believed that liberal-led ecumenical organizations 
had replaced evangelism with social justice campaigns – and some fundamentalists remained anti-
Catholic.295 
Schmemann’s 1975 essay “The Ecumenical Agony” clarified real objections to 
ecumenism. The paper responded to the Hartford Appeal – an ecumenical document that rebuked 
ideas that were undermining Christianity.296 At first, the Hartford Appeal seemed like a document 
with which Schmemann would agree. Orthodox clergy collaborated on it, with three of them 
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signing it, including Thomas Hopko – future dean of St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary.297 The 
document also countered Schmemann’s objections to Western society: “modernity” and “science.” 
For example, one argument it discussed was the claim that “All religions are equally valid; the 
choice among them is not a matter of conviction about truth but only a personal preference or life 
style.”298  
The problem with this argument, according to the authors, was that it “flattens diversity 
and ignores contradictions” across Christian traditions.299 The authors affirmed the “importance of 
exploring and confronting all manifestations of the religious quest and of learning from the riches 
of other religions,” but “truth matters; therefore, differences among religions are deeply 
significant.”300 To Schmemann, this answer was unacceptable for two reasons: First, it did not say 
that Orthodoxy was the one, true faith. Since representatives from many Christian traditions 
collaborated on the document, it would never affirm the truth of any single faith. Second, it 
demonstrated a submission to “thinking without God,” or secularism.301 Instead of disproving the 
point with Orthodox arguments, the authors respected differences between religious traditions.  
Schmemann called this approach the “dissolution of religion.”302 By separating Orthodox thought 
from social issues, Schmemann asserted that Western cultures rebalanced “man-centered culture” 
and “God-centered religion.”303 To Schmemann, these distinctions were incongruent with 
Orthodoxy, and removing religion from social issues would result in the “triumph of man-centered 
culture and the secularist rebellion.”304 
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The problem of ecumenism was the adoption of Western assumptions by Orthodox 
Christians. To Schmemann, this process was inevitable. Western society did not assume Orthodox 
values, meaning Orthodox theology, tradition, and liturgy.305 Since Western culture surrounded 
Orthodox Christians, they were “exposed to the Western way of life and to the Western vision and 
experience of the world.”306 Worse yet, Western culture constantly challenged Orthodox 
Christians. Because of their differing assumptions, the West “consciously or unconsciously 
[reduced] her [Orthodoxy] to values, philosophies of life and world-views profoundly different 
from, if not totally opposed to, her vision and experience of God, man and life.”307 Since the West 
altered the meaning of Orthodoxy, Orthodox Christians misunderstood their religion as they 
viewed it through Western ideas.  
According to Schmemann, a Western assumption that Orthodox Christians adopted was 
“historical reduction.” Orthodox clergy had reduced 
Theology . . . to texts, to ‘conceptual’ evidence to the exclusion of the living 
experience of the Church, to which it refers and bears testimony, without which it 
cannot be understood in its total and precisely ‘existential’ meaning and 
significance.308 
In the postwar era, Orthodox in North America experienced a scholarly revival. With the reopening 
of St. Vladimir’s theological seminary and the immigration of Orthodox scholars displaced by war 
to America, Orthodox clergy brought America to the forefront of Orthodox debates.309 However, 
in doing so, Schmemann believed they had “equated tradition with the past,” as Western 
civilization did.310 The past was the subject of academic study, but tradition was “to be lived and 
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experienced” in the present through liturgy.311 The separation of tradition from experience alarmed 
Schmemann because postwar Orthodox scholarship, instead of explaining how to be an exemplary 
Orthodox Christian, used Church history and Fathers as “authorities simply to be quoted for a 
formal justification of ideas, affirmations, and even ‘theologies’ whose roots and presuppositions 
may have very little, if anything, to do with the Orthodox faith.”312 
Divorcing tradition from experience pushed Orthodox Christians to adopt Western ideas. 
Because Church tradition and history were objects of scholarly debates, Orthodox clergy had made 
a “theology for theologians.”313 Laity did not understand how clergy’s writings related to being a 
better Orthodox Christian. Moreover, clergy did not know how to relate their scholarship to the 
laity. As Schmemann wrote in 1979, “We [clergy] do not know what to do with it [Orthodox 
history and traditions] except analyze it in scholarly books and periodicals, from inside an 
academic ivory tower standing in the midst of general, although respectful, indifference.”314 
Because of this disconnect, lay members found themselves in “spiritual and cultural crisis.”315 
They turned to Western ideas for explanations of their experience, driving them away from 
Orthodoxy.  
To resolve this issue, Orthodox clergy needed to reconnect experience and tradition. 
Schmemann understood experience outside the Western definition: “psychological, 
individualistic, and subjectivist.”316 He defined it as,  
Precisely [that which] cannot be reduced to the categories of the ‘subjective’ and 
‘objective,’ ‘individual’ and ‘corporate.’ This is the experience of the Church as 
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new reality, new creation, new life – as a reality . . . not of some ‘other world’ but 
of creation and life renewed and transformed in Christ, made into the knowledge of 
and the communion with God and his eternal Kingdom. It is the experience . . . 
radically new because it is not of ‘this world,’ but whose gift and presence, 
continuity and fulfillment in ‘this world’ is the Church.317 
To experience “communion with God” on earth, Schmemann urged the Orthodox to turn to liturgy. 
As he explained, “Liturgical experience . . . which is the very gift and expression of the Church’s 
experience and which alone therefore transcends the past, the present and future, which alone 
actualizes Tradition into life, fullness and power.”318 
Schmemann was not turning to liturgy because OCA members had forgotten it. Rather, he 
was countering a misconception that he believed dominated the West: that liturgy, theology, and 
piety are distinct.319 Liturgical theology is “liturgy, theology, and piety reintegrat[ed] within one 
fundamental vision.”320 To Schmemann, the paradox that “the Church is in the world, but not of 
it” expressed this vision: liturgy makes the “church . . . the manifestation and presence of the . . . 
Kingdom of God” on earth.321 However, to fulfill the vision of God, Orthodox Christians must 
balance their appreciation for liturgy, theology, and spirituality. Those who separated liturgy from 
theology and piety observed ceremonies but did not participate in liturgy – as the non-Orthodox 
did when they watched in awe at the spectacle of Orthodox services. Those who separated theology 
from liturgy and piety made liturgy an intellectual exercise – as the Orthodox clergy did with their 
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“theology of theologians.” Those who separated piety from liturgy and theology lost liturgy’s 
living content.322  
Schmemann related his understanding of liturgical theology to resisting western influence. 
With the correct practice of liturgy, God would 
Impress on the soul of man the Orthodox vision of life and . . . help him live in 
accordance with that vision. . . . The influence of liturgy on our ideas, decisions, 
behavior, evaluations – on the totality of our life. This was for centuries and 
centuries the real function of the liturgy in the Orthodox church: to immerse the 
man in the spiritual reality, beauty, and depth of the Kingdom of God and to change 
his mind and heart.323 
With an understanding of Orthodoxy, Orthodox Christians would no longer look to the West to 
understand their experiences. 
 Moreover, with the correct practice of liturgy, Orthodox Christians could participate in 
ecumenism without fear of Western influence. Schmemann supported ecumenism for several 
reasons. First, he wanted to combat the “Western mindset” by participating in religious affairs. By 
interacting with the non-Orthodox, Schmemann believed they would realize that Orthodoxy is the 
“fourth largest religion.”324 Second, being “in the world, but not of it” necessitated interactions 
with the world. The Church could not isolate itself from the world and create God’s kingdom on 
earth.325  Third, since the OCA identified itself as an “American” Orthodox Church, which 
Schmemann defined as lacking “national or ethnic” affiliations, Orthodox Christians needed to 
engage with the “American religious landscape.”326 Lastly, with correct liturgical theology, 
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Orthodox Christians would not adopt Western ideas from ecumenical interactions. Instead, they 
would demonstrate God’s truth and lead the non-Orthodox into the Church. 
John Meyendorff and Ecumenism 
Meyendorff and Schmemann shared many opinions on ecumenism. Like Schmemann, Meyendorff 
was an immigrant to the United States and had attended St. Serguis’ Theological Seminary.327 
They had both experienced Evlogy’s idea of ecumenism and Meyendorff believed that since the 
Orthodox Church was the one “Church of God,” ecumenism should be an effort to bring the non-
Orthodox into the Church. Additionally, he believed that ecumenism aligned with the catholicity 
of the Orthodoxy Church: 
“catholic . . . [it] is concerned with the whole of humanity, with the whole of Truth 
and with everything positive and good happening in the world; if we refuse to learn, 
to listen, to be concerned with the life and beliefs of other Christians, we will not 
only miss much ourselves, but we will also be unfaithful to Christ's commandment 
of love and to our responsibility to witness to Orthodoxy everywhere.328  
This duty to be open to the non-Orthodox contradicted other Orthodox leaders’ critiques 
of ecumenism. In 1969, Protopresbyter George Grabbe of the Russian Orthodox Church outside 
Russia published an article titled “Uppsala and Orthodoxy.” The article responded to the Upsalla 
Conference, the Fourth Assembly of the WCC. Specifically, Grabbe disagreed with the 
conference’s “Message to the World,” which detested racism and income inequality, while 
affirming a commitment to church unity and the truth of religious knowledge against scientific 
challenges.329 According to Grabbe, the WCC was not ecumenical; it cared more about spreading 
“propaganda of leftist social circles” than bringing the non-Orthodox into the Orthodox Church or 
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any Christian faith.330 This opinion echoed a speech delivered by ROCOR Metropolitan Philaret a 
year before. According to Philaret, participation in the WCC exposed Orthodoxy to this “poisonous 
heresy” usually preached “outside the Church.”331 Although Orthodox Christians might not 
collaborate on every decision WCC assemblies released, being part of the organization meant OCA 
leaders supported its perversion of ecumenism. 
Interestingly, Meyendorff shared Grabbes and Philaret’s frustrations with the ecumenical 
movement. As a member of the WCC’s Faith and Order commission, he collaborated with non-
Orthodox Christians to release joint statements on theological issues.332 In 1982, Meyendorff 
became frustrated with the commission. It had written a joint statement on “Baptism, Eucharist, 
and Ministry,” issues that Meyendorff believed were “truly essential” to Christianity. The 
document excited him because it featured some “Orthodox beliefs”: “that baptism leads to the 
Church, that the Eucharist is the Great sacrifice of praise” and the real presence of the crucified 
and risen Christ,” and that the “threefold ministry of bishop, presbyter, and deacon” was the church 
structure ordained by God.333 Meyendorff believed Protestants would affirm the statement because 
it was “not yet an Orthodox document.”334 In other words, it had substantial points of agreements 
with Protestant traditions. When the document failed to receive support of the assembly, 
Meyendorff lamented that the WCC “apparently forgot [ecumenism’s] original goal.” Instead of 
searching for “Christian unity in faith,” it turned ecumenism into “political hopes” for social 
reform and “bureaucratic structures.”335 
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The view that the WCC and liberal Protestants had abandoned ecumenism’s “original goal” 
was a charge repeated by conservative evangelicals.336 However, while ROCOR and evangelicals 
decried the ecumenical movement as a propagator of secular assumptions and leftist thought, 
Meyendorff remained committed to the WCC. There were a few reasons for his decision. First, 
although the statement on “Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministries” failed, it proved that “a strong and 
articulate Orthodox voice [can succeed] in achieving true progress on some essential points of the 
case.”337 Second, Meyendorff believed Orthodoxy benefitted from the secular ideas the WCC 
propagated, specifically the “civil liberties” that allowed Orthodox Christians to practice their 
religion in “the ‘heretical’ West.”338 Lastly, the Church must avoid isolationism. Without an 
“Orthodox witness” at the WCC, the non-Orthodox would ignore Orthodoxy and never realize its 
truth.339   
Conclusion 
The ecumenical movement of the twentieth century emerged from two different and conflicting 
experiences in the West and the East. On one hand, it emerged out of a century of Western 
Protestant history: the Second Great Awakening, the Social Gospel Movement, and the “civilizing 
mission” of imperialism. Liberal Protestants such as John Raleigh Mott sought to “Christianize,” 
spreading Protestantism and Western civilization to the unsaved. In the postcolonial era, the social 
and racial injustices of imperialism disillusioned them. As colonies turned away from Christianity 
and Western influence, liberal Protestants changed their messaging. They adopted Marxian 
critiques of themselves, viewing their previous mission work as “cultural imperialism.” Willem 
Hooft offered a solution to this reflection: instead of imposing Western civilization, Protestants 
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should focus on core doctrines – respecting cultural differences and tailoring their message to the 
non-Christians’ social context. His approach also focused on uniting through common beliefs, not 
exclusively through Protestantism, allowing non-Protestant Christians to enter the ecumenical 
movement.  
On the other hand, Orthodox Christians viewed ecumenism as a means to convert the non-
Orthodox into the Orthodox Church. This interpretation was historical, based in centuries of 
missionary work, but also reflected the recent ecumenical relationships the Orthodox had built 
with Anglicans in Western Europe. Metropolitan Evlogy facilitated ecumenical dialogue between 
Anglicans and Orthodox Christians during the early twentieth century, perceiving the Anglicans 
wanting to adopt Eastern traditions and enter the Church. St. Serguis, the theological seminary 
Schmemann and Meyendorff, became a center of these ecumenical debates, leading them to 
believe ecumenism brought the non-Orthodox into the Church.  
The difference between liberal Protestant and Orthodox views of ecumenism produced 
tensions in the WCC. Meyendorff and Schmemann became frustrated that the organization had 
not realized the truth of Orthodoxy and instead focused on social issues. For Schmemann, the 
problems of the WCC would continue until the Orthodox adopted their faith to their Western 
context and showed Westerners how to live an authentic, Orthodox life through liturgical theology. 
Until then, Orthodox Christians would succumb to Western ideas and deviate from Orthodoxy. 
Meyendorff shared Schmemann’s opinions, although he believed Western ideas such as religious 
freedom were beneficial to Orthodoxy. With religious freedom, the Orthodox could practice their 
faith in the West, unlike their coreligionists in the Soviet Union. Moreover, both of these 
theologians believed that, although the WCC was antithetical to Orthodox understandings of 
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ecumenism, the OCA needed to maintain its membership.  Without Orthodox representation in the 
organization, the WCC would never realize the truth of Orthodoxy. 
Schmemann and Meyendorff demonstrated a tension between isolationism and 
ecumenism. Like Metropolitan Philaret and Grabbes, they could have endorsed removing 
Orthodoxy from the West’s religious affairs. Instead, they believed that no challenges could 
disprove the truth of Orthodoxy; therefore, the ecumenical movement presented no existential 
threat to Orthodoxy. Schmemann and Meyendorff also revealed anxieties over relativism. 
Schmemann’s response to the Hartford Appeal demonstrated his anxiety that modern Western 
culture would reduce Orthodoxy to one of many equally valid religious truths. Furthermore, 
Schmemann showed how Orthodox Christians were aware of how Westerners viewed them, 
specifically through Western thought and assumptions.  
Today, the OCA maintains Schmemann and Meyendorff’s approach to ecumenism. In its 
statement “On Christian Unity and Ecumenism,” the Church justifies its continued membership in 
the WCC: 
We, the bishops of the Orthodox Church in America, consider it our God-given 
duty to confess once again the nature of the unity which Christ has given to His 
Church, and to warn all Christians against those forms of union which are not given 
by God and consequently are not acceptable to the Orthodox Faith. It is our purpose 
as well to remind the members of the Orthodox Church of the principles which have 
guided us in our ecumenical activity in the past.340 
The OCA’s official position is optimistic about the non-Orthodox realizing the truth of Orthodoxy 
and converting. As a result, it remains the Orthodox witness to the West.  
                                                 




Chapter Three, Fighting Secularism: Orthodox Christians and America’s Culture Wars, 
1970-1999 
Introduction 
When I asked OCA Priest Edward Pehanich about his pro-life activism during the late twentieth 
century, he went straight to the point: “My thinking was: ‘I see what abortion is. I see what the 
Church has always taught. Why isn’t anyone saying or doing anything about it?”341 To Pehanich, 
abortion was a “horrible evil.”342 Two other OCA members, John and Valerie Protopapas, agreed, 
so they formed the Orthodox Christians for Life (OCL) in 1986.343 Admittedly, Pehanich and his 
peers were late to the pro-life cause. Following the sexual liberation that the sixties that challenged 
norms around gender roles and sexuality, conservative Christians tried to reclaim cultural 
influence.344 In 1968, pro-life Catholics founded the National Right to Life Committee.345 In the 
1970s, Francis Schaeffer rallied conservative evangelicals around abortion as an issue that 
represented Christianity’s loss of influence in the world.346 Unlike other conservative Christian 
groups, pro-life activism remained a low priority among the Orthodox. Pehanich recalled the OCL 
having twelve members when they attended the March for Life rally in 1987.347 
In the late twentieth century, the OCA was still insecure about its position in the West. In 
1978, John Meyendorff,   
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In this last quarter of the twentieth century[,] the Orthodox Church and Orthodox 
theology find themselves in a very peculiar and divided situation. In Eastern 
Europe, where most Orthodox Christians live, political conditions are making any 
expression of living theology very difficult. . . . Moreover[,] the tragic and artificial 
isolation of the Orthodox communities may one day be recognized as providential. 
Cutting off Orthodoxy . . . may well protect it from the temptations and vagaries of 
contemporary Western secularism.348  
The idea that Soviet oppression protected Orthodoxy from Western secularism signaled a change 
in how the Orthodox Church in America (OCA) viewed the relationship between Orthodoxy and 
Western society. Six years earlier, Meyendorff wrote in St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly that 
the “American Orthodox Church, investing with freedom and dynamism learned in the West, can 
have a ‘mission’ to the Mother Churches of the Orthodox East, where freedom does not exist and 
dynamism is impaired by law and custom.”349 As Meyendorff explained earlier in the article, the 
“mission” of the Orthodox Church was the “expansion and preservation of that tradition 
[Orthodoxy].” His changing opinion suggests that, although Orthodox Christians escaped Soviet 
oppression in the West, he doubted whether Orthodoxy escaped secularism in the West.    
Meyendorff’s peers shared his concern. A year earlier, the dean of St. Vladimir Theological 
Seminary Alexander Schmemann had characterized the Soviet Union as the “tragic halt” of 
Orthodox history: the forces of secularism had conquered “Orthodoxy [when it] began to emerge 
from its Eastern isolation and to regain the universal spirit.”350 The Soviet Union stopped 
Orthodoxy from spreading outside the East; however, Schmemann did not view the West as an 
escape from secularism. Instead, he believed that secularism emerged in both the East and the 
West:  
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The tragedy is that this development in Russia was not the only one, but in fact . . .  
there grew as well that terrible divarication [secularism] which ended in the triumph 
of Bolshevism. . . . Again, there have been many disputes over the Western or the 
Eastern sources of this evil [secularism].351 
The West was not an escape from secularism; at worst, it was a source of secularism. 
Orthodox scholars’ concerns over whether the West offered sanctuary to Orthodoxy or 
threatened it with secularism reflected two anxieties related to the ecumenical movement – the first 
being whether ecumenism could combat secularism. After World War II, the OCA became a 
member of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and National Council of Churches of Christ 
(NCC).352 Besides official memberships in ecumenical organizations, Ecumenical Patriarch 
Athenagoras I began formal dialogues with the Roman Catholic Church – coauthoring the Decrees 
of Ecumenism in 1964.353 OCA leaders saw the potential of ecumenism to spread Orthodoxy, but 
they also recognized the importance of unifying all Christians against secularism during the Cold 
War. As Nicolas Zernov, an Orthodox Christian advocate for ecumenism, argued, “The future of 
mankind depends on the restoration of Christian unity, and the reconciliation of Eastern and 
Western Christians. . . . The ecumenical movement has made possible their friendly encounter.”354 
However, in the late twentieth century, Orthodox Christians began to doubt whether ecumenism 
was a solution or result of secularism. According to John Erickson, the domination of ecumenical 
bodies by liberal Protestant denominations has made ecumenism increasingly “at odds with 
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Orthodox values,” especially with liberal Protestants’ differing views on abortion and 
homosexuality.355 
This chapter argues that from 1970 to the end of the twentieth century, Orthodox Christians 
remained concerned over secularism in Western society – as they were after World War II. 
However, changes in American society challenged the ways the OCA combatted secularism. 
Previously, church leaders had joined ecumenical organizations and started dialogues with the 
Roman Catholic Church to form a unified, Christian front against secularism in the Soviet bloc. 
As liberal Protestants adopted progressive positions on gender roles, sexuality, and marriage, these 
ecumenical relationships strained as Orthodox Christians worried about domestic, secular 
influence. The OCA maintained its membership in ecumenical organizations, but some of its 
members found new approaches to combat secular influence. Mixed responses from Orthodox 
Patriarchates to the culture war obstructed OCA clergy from forming a unified response. A belief 
that politicization distracted Christians from Orthodox interpretations of moral issues also hindered 
OCA clergy from responding to these issues. To sidestep these problems, some clergy indirectly 
addressed culture war issues, framing them as Orthodox discussions of marriage and women 
priests. Nonetheless, as OCA clergy argued against direct involvement in culture war issues for 
themselves, a small group of low-level clergy and laity understood their writings as support for 
social conservatism. In response, they enthusiastically joined social conservative causes, such as 
pro-life activism.   
Although some Orthodox Christians understood ecumenism as a force against secularism, 
others feared ecumenism would fail to create a universal Orthodox Church. Part of Orthodox belief 
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is that it is the original Christian faith, passed down from antiquity through the Orthodox 
Church.356 Some Orthodox Christians viewed ecumenism as a means to spread Orthodoxy and 
unify Christians under the original church. As Nicolas Zernov wrote, “It is not the expansion of 
one faith over all the world, but in meeting together in communion with their Risen Lord that 
Christian will be restored to that Catholic fellowship which is their true glory – the Orthodoxy – 
of the Church.”357 As the ecumenical movement succeeded, schisms would resolve, denominations 
would dissolve, and Christians would unite under Orthodoxy. However, unity under Orthodoxy 
never occurred. As Meyendorff lamented, Protestant groups were “indifferent to the traditional 
Orthodox stand,” citing an instance when the Episcopal Church “rejected a proposal . . . to drop 
the Latin filioque in their creed.”358 Despite ecumenical relationships, churches showed no signs 
of adopting Orthodoxy.  
Despite disappointment in ecumenism, the OCA did not abandon the project. The OCA is 
still a member of the NCC and the WCC and holds formal dialogues with the Roman Catholic 
Church.359 In 2005, to reflect on the previous decades of ecumenical work and coordinate missions 
in North America, OCA clergy convened the Fourteenth All-American Council.360 In a paper 
submitted to the council, one clergyman lamented the failures of Orthodoxy to obtain mainstream 
cultural influence in the West: 
The pros and cons of ecumenism, along with the Church’s understanding and 
approach to moral issues, are not only becoming intertwined with American politics 
but are also becoming dependent on the practices and mentalities of sister Churches 
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abroad. Insecurity is creating a mentality in our Church which seeks the approval 
and acceptance of other Churches, even though they too need to sort through and 
reevaluate their own lives vis à vis Holy Tradition. Hence, the voice and vision of 
the Church in America lack the vitality and clarity necessary for proclaiming the 
changeless Gospel in an ever-changing environment.361 
While Schmemann believed ecumenism failed because of secular influence, other Orthodox clergy 
diagnosed the failure of ecumenism as the politicization of moral issues. As one writer wrote in St. 
Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, “Christians have forgotten how to speak properly about their 
very own principles. Their convictions have been ensnared by ideological clichés.”362 Although 
this author premised his argument on the false dichotomy that politics and religion are separate in 
the United States, it revealed an anxiety in the OCA: Christians judge moral issues through politics 
instead of holy tradition. Christians would never turn to Orthodoxy because politics clouded their 
judgement. The problem was with how Christians understood the world, not Orthodoxy.   
 This view reinforced Orthodox dogma – specifically the “living continuity”: Orthodoxy is 
the truth, but politicization prevented the non-Orthodox from realizing it. One could suggest that 
the OCA’s view on politicization led it to be apolitical. The reality is more complicated. While 
most of the writings published by Orthodox institutions and scholars during the late twentieth 
century were on Orthodox liturgy, saints, and history (in the decades-long effort to make 
Orthodoxy accessible to an American audience), they also wrote on the role of women in churches, 
personhood, and marriage. Although these works do not explicitly mention the broader political 
context, their appearance in the 1970s and 1980s suggests that they were at least partially a 
response to culture war issues. As Robert Putnam and David Campbell explained, culture war 
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issues emerged after the sexual and cultural revolutions of the sixties, as many dissatisfied 
Americans returned to religion and social conservatism to changing gender roles, sexual liberation, 
and abortion.363 
 Some American Orthodox Christians responded the culture war more directly. A small 
group of conservative Orthodox Christians formed a coalition of pro-life activists known as 
Orthodox Christians for Life (OCL). Three members of the OCA, two of whom were low-level 
clergy, founded the organization in 1986: Reverend Father Edward Pehanich, Reverend Deacon 
John Protopapas, and Matushka Valerie Protopapas. Additionally, there were pro-life voices 
outside the OCA, namely Bishop Kallistos Ware. Although OCL was small, it was significant in 
two ways: first, it revealed a disconnect between bishops – who avoided political action but 
indirectly commented on culture war issues through their writings – and low-level clergy and laity 
– who showed more inclination towards activism on culture war issues. Second, it showed the 
counterintuitive unity of interfaith politics. Conservative Orthodox Christians detested ecumenism 
as the “pan-heresy of the age.”364 However, conservative Orthodox Christians found themselves 
working with Catholics to advance the pro-life cause. This development reveals two characteristics 
about the nature of interfaith politics: first, while moral issues strained Orthodoxy’s ecumenical 
relationships with liberal Christians, social conservativism offered it new allies. Second, the 
framework of American social conservatism persuaded some Orthodox Christians to rethink the 
secular threat. Before the 1970s, the secular threat lay behind the Iron Curtain. After the cultural 
and social upheavals of the 1960s, secularism was, to an equal extent, a domestic threat. To 
conservative Orthodox Christians, fighting secularism required building relationships with 
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domestic non-Orthodox Christians – a mindset that reduced their priority on international, 
ecumenical organizations.   
 This chapter seeks to understand how American Orthodox Christians engaged in the culture 
wars of the late twentieth century. To do so, it will focus on Orthodox Christians’ pro-life activism 
and commentary on abortion. Orthodox Christians related abortion to other culture war issues, 
such as marriage, gender roles, and sexuality. Their attitude and actions on the abortion question 
reveal how many Orthodox Christians confronted challenges to a host of related culture war 
debates, and how Orthodox Christians related to other pro-life activists.  
 This chapter also reveals the new step in Americanization for the OCA: before the 1970s, 
the OCA Americanized by publishing works in English, appointing bishops who spoke English, 
replacing Russian clergy with English-speaking priests, and allowing churches to conduct liturgy 
and services in English.365 During the late twentieth century, the OCA and Orthodoxy 
Americanized as the Fourteenth All-American Council said, “by becoming intertwined with 
American politics.”366 This development would come to the fore in conservative Orthodox 
Christians’ protests against the membership of Michael Dukakis, a pro-choice politician, in the 
Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North America.   
Straining Ecumenical Relationships: The NCC Incident 
The politics of the 1970s challenged the alliances that the Orthodox Church in America (OCA) 
had built over the past twenty years. From the 1950s, the OCA connected to the Protestant 
mainstream through ecumenical organizations, specifically the World Council of Churches (WCC) 
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and the National Council of Churches (NCC).367 The latter organization connected the OCA with 
mainline Protestant churches – which, during the midcentury, formed the largest group of 
Protestant denominations in America.368 The OCA also became more distinctly American: since 
World War II, its laity had pressured the clergy to offer services and publications in English so 
their spouses and children could understand Orthodoxy.369 However, one impulse within the OCA 
remained from before World War II: the desire for Christian unity. Ecumenism allowed OCA 
leaders to expand their influence outside the Orthodox community in hopes of evangelizing the 
non-Orthodox. In 1968, challenges arose to the OCA’s involvement in ecumenism. Metropolitan 
Philaret of the Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia detested ecumenism as “the conviction 
that there is no One and True Church on earth, but only communities of men who are in varying 
degrees of error [from Christ’s Church].”370 Alexander Schmemann disagreed with Philaret’s 
charge that ecumenism undermined the existence of one “True Church.” Schmemann responded 
that the OCA practices a “good” form of ecumenism that facilitates “greater unity” among 
Christians under Orthodoxy.371 Ecumenism, as the OCA practiced it, would create the one true 
Christian church by spreading Orthodoxy.   
The “greater unity” between the OCA and non-Orthodox Christians faltered as abortion 
tested the limits of their ecumenical alliances. In 1970, the NCC elected Reverend W. Sterling 
Cary as president. Cary’s tenure demonstrated some changes and continuities within the 
organization. Although he received his theological education from New York’s 
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interdenominational Union Theological Seminary, he was as pastor for a Presbyterian church 
before becoming president of the NCC.372 He served as a pastor for an interdenominational church 
in Brooklyn and maintained the NCC’s connections to mainline Protestant churches. Cary pushed 
issues that previous conferences had not considered – particularly abortion. The issue of abortion 
did not cause problems in the conference; rather, Cary’s approach to it was controversial. Although 
he sought to include the NCC’s thirty-three denominations in the dialogues on abortion, the 
organization’s resolutions always reflected the opinions of the Presbyterian Church of the US: 
favoring the “removal of abortion from the sanctions of criminal law” and urging “churches to act 
as advocates for . . . public policies . . . [so] a valid choice can be made” on abortion.373  
The OCA’s response to the NCC’s abortion resolution was partially a result of Cary’s 
support for abortion. By 1970, some Orthodox Christians had expressed concern over abortion – 
although the Supreme Court would not decide Roe v Wade for three years and conservatives 
Christians would not bring abortion to the forefront of politics until the late 1970s and 1980s.374 
Most Orthodox Christians who endorsed pro-life organizations before 1970 were Greek Orthodox 
clergy.375 In contrast, the OCA’s position on abortion was unclear. Generally, Orthodox clergy 
cited early Church writings to oppose abortion – characterizing the act as murder.376 In 1963, 
Kallistos Ware wrote that Orthodoxy “unambiguously condemned” abortion.377 Although some 
conservative Orthodox Christians held that early church writings proved that Orthodoxy always 
disapproved of abortion, history proved otherwise. Historically, Orthodoxy deferred to the state 
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on abortion. In Byzantium, the state condemned abortion as murder, but abortions still occurred 
because the law made no distinction between abortion and miscarriages.378 In the Russian Empire, 
midwives performed abortions and, in the late nineteenth century, abortions increased as the state 
relaxed its penalty.380 Soviet policy allowed abortion, although Stalin banned it from 1936-1955 
to increase birth rates.381 Before the late twentieth century, Orthodoxy lacked a strong abortion 
stance. Abortion was a state affair and commonplace in Orthodox nations due to lax laws and 
enforcement.  
However, OCA leaders were frustrated that the NCC consulted and adopted Protestant 
positions on abortion – not Orthodox ones. One Orthodox priest believed that the abortion debate 
was a “divergent point of view between majority Protestants and minority Eastern Orthodox 
Christians in the council. We are being pressed to the breaking point.”382 Schmemann’s vision of 
“good ecumenism” faltered; Protestants were looking to one another for guidance on moral issues, 
not Orthodoxy.   
While the OCA did not leave the NCC over this dispute, the incident revealed several 
tensions in their relationship. First, the OCA found itself awkwardly caught between progressivism 
and ecumenism. Although the OCA lacked an official position on abortion, the NCC recognized 
Orthodoxy as socially conservative.383 NCC president Cary recognized that his position angered 
conservative Orthodox Christians and that appeasing the OCA was important. Like the OCA, 
Roman Catholics staunchly rejected important aspects of Protestant theology, and many were 
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socially conservative. In the early 1970s, the NCC was trying to court Catholic churches to join 
the organization.384 Failing to accommodate the OCA’s socially conservative positions might 
discourage Catholics from joining. Later, when the NCC retracted its stance on abortion – instead 
acknowledging that the diverse opinions within the organization prevented one position from 
representing its members – it did so because its stance on abortion prevented the realization of 
ecumenism’s goal: Christian unity.385 
To conservative Orthodox Christians, ecumenism forced the OCA to compromise its 
doctrines, dogmas, and beliefs for harmony with other Christians. Orthodox supporters and 
opponents of ecumenism knew that that it would pose this challenge before the NCC’s abortion 
debate – as evidenced by Metropolitan Philaret and Schmemann’s writings. Schmemann had 
assured the OCA that it was pursuing “good” ecumenism; however, he assumed that ecumenism 
would prove to other Christians the truth of Orthodox Christianity – leading to their converting to 
the Orthodox Church. This assumption was not unique to Schmemann; rather, it was prominent in 
the OCA. Thomas Hopko, a professor at St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary, likewise believed 
that American Protestants and Catholics would find Orthodoxy’s “scriptures, doctrines, 
sacraments, canons, spirituality, and hierarchical structures” persuading and subsequently enter 
the “one, holy, catholic, Orthodox Church.”386 However, the abortion incident disproved the idea 
of “good” ecumenism; the NCC had not consulted the OCA on abortion, instead deferring to the 
Presbyterian position. As Orthodoxy entered America’s mainstream and connected with a 
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Protestant-led organization, the OCA found itself sidelined by the Protestant establishment. The 
OCA needed to renegotiate its relationship with America’s religious landscape. 
How Orthodoxy Addressed Abortion and Culture War Issues in the Late Twentieth Century  
As Neil J. Young explains in We Gather Together: The Religious Right and the Problem of 
Interfaith Politics, “The Religious Right was not monolithic: it was a diverse and intricate network 
that contained, endured, and suffered internal tensions, denominational divisions, and often 
competing agendas.”387 Although Young’s work covers evangelicals, conservative Catholics, and 
Mormons during the rise of the Religious Right, his analysis also applies to American Orthodox 
Christians during the late twentieth century. Orthodox Christians became increasingly concerned 
with American political and cultural issues during this time. Understanding how they fit into the 
Religious Right does not mean assuming ideological harmony with their socially conservative 
peers; it requires examining how their differences and similarities led to schism, unity, and the 
advancement of their agenda. 
Placing Orthodox Christians within late-twentieth century American politics is difficult 
due to the focus of preexisting scholarship. Mark Noll has characterized the period as a time of 
“ethnic conflict” between Orthodox ethnic sects that remained divided over Old World politics.388 
John Erickson echoes Noll’s conclusion by explaining how ethnic divisions prevented pan-
Orthodox unity during the postwar period.389 Noll and Erickson are correct to assert the importance 
of ethnic divisions in the Church; St. Vladimir’s Seminary produced countless works on issues 
such as ecumenism and pan-Orthodox unity. Schmemann and Meyendorff – deans of the seminary 
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during the late twentieth century – wrote essays titled Unity of Church – Unity of Mankind for the 
seminary’s quarterly.390 However, historians’ focus on these issues ignores how American 
Orthodox Christians became increasingly aware and interested in American politics and culture.  
Although their institutions focused on ecumenism and pan-Orthodox unity, Orthodox 
Christians confronted issues including abortion, school prayer, and sexual liberation like their 
Catholic and Protestant peers. Recent sociological works show how this shift occurred. As Peter 
Berger wrote, for most of the twentieth century, Orthodox Christians had been on the “defensive” 
to demonstrate that Christianity included Orthodoxy – not just Catholicism and Protestantism.391 
As a result, Orthodoxy had never influenced American culture in a widespread way. Oliver Herbel 
countered Berger’s argument, believing that Orthodoxy’s “defensive” posture positioned it inside 
America’s spiritual marketplace. People converted to Orthodoxy because it positioned itself 
outside Protestantism and Catholicism – offering new ways to engage religious, cultural, and 
political questions through Eastern traditions and liturgy.392 By the late twentieth century, 
Orthodox Christians composed a larger part of the United States population – about nineteen 
percent of the “Other” category of the National Opinion Research Center’s General Social Survey, 
1973-1996.393 While this percent seemed small, it was similar to the size of Judaism.394 Moreover, 
by the late twentieth century, the OCA was no longer a church of immigrants; Soviet immigrants 
usually formed their own parishes or joined ROCOR.395 With growing presence in the United 
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States and familiarity with their American context, Orthodox Christians confronted American 
cultural issues.     
Nonetheless, Orthodox Christians varied in their reluctance to enter America’s culture 
wars, examining the work of those who eagerly joined shows how some Orthodox thinkers’ 
approaches to culture war issues resonated and differed from that of other traditions. One of these 
Orthodox Christians was John Kowalczyk. Little information is available about Kowalcyzk except 
that he is a priest of the Orthodox Church in America.396 Nonetheless, his work is important for 
two reasons: First, he published a pamphlet in 1977 that outlined an Orthodox argument against 
abortion, offering insight into Orthodox pro-life writings before conservatives pioneered the issue 
in the 1980s. Second, the Orthodox Christians for Life (OCL) and its founders cite his work as an 
inspiration.397 
In his pamphlet An Orthodox View of Abortion, Kowalcyzk begins his argument against 
abortion by explaining the importance of marriage. He writes, “The first man and woman were 
created in a state of sacred unity; unity with God, and unity with one another.”398 This reference 
to the Garden of Eden lays the groundwork for his argument. He continues by explaining that 
man’s fall from grace separated man and God. The connection between marriage and the Fall of 
Man remains unclear until he writes, “the original unity of husband and wife [that Adam and Eve 
experienced in the Garden of Eden] is likewise restored in the Church through the mystery of Holy 
Matrimony. In this sacrament, a man and a woman become one flesh and spirit.”399 Kowalcyzk’s 
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analysis of marriage would be mildly dissonant to Protestants. While Orthodoxy and Protestants 
view marriage as ordained by God, only Orthodox, Catholics, and some Anglicans views it as a 
sacrament.400 Moreover, evangelicals believe marriage has theological significance. As 
evangelicals Tim and Beverly Lahaye wrote in their book The Act of Marriage: The Beauty of 
Sexual Love, “the act of marriage is that beautiful and intimate relationship . . . . God designed 
them for that relationship.”401 Nonetheless, this distinction does not conflict with Kowalcyzk’s 
main point: God ordains marriage and it is His way of forming a covenant with men and women.  
Kowalcyzk connects the covenant of marriage to abortion by making God a participant in 
conception. At the beginning of his pamphlet, he explains that God created man – evoking the idea 
that man is in God’s image. The Image of God is an old theological idea, but Kowalcyzk does not 
reference it to debate human nature as past theologians have; instead, he cites it to illustrate God’s 
role in marriage:  
We cannot compare man to any other creature, for man is not a mere creature, but he is 
man, created in the image and likeness of God. Man alone is called by God to participate 
with Him in His creative work. And the highest and greatest form of creativity possible 
for man lies in the natural fruit of sexual relations between husband and wife – the 
bearing of children.402 
Although God unites men and women through marriage, Kowalcyzk does not believe that the 
couple can create life alone. As in the Garden of Eden, only God creates man. Marriage perpetuates 
the covenant between man and God that existed in the Garden of Eden – allowing God to create 
man after the Fall from Grace. Therefore, sexual relations between a husband and wife allow them 
to participate in God’s creation through “the bearing of children.” This idea also resonated with 
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contemporary evangelical writing, as Tim and Beverly Lahaye wrote, “God has granted to a 
husband and wife a unique ability . . . to create another human being.”403  
Kowalcyzk’s points on marriage and sexuality slightly vary from the standard positions in 
Orthodox theology. Traditionally, Orthodoxy believes that sexuality is how God’s children relate 
to one another and marriage is a means to deification.404 In other words, marriage creates the 
“domestic church” – the family – and children are blessings from God.405 Kowalcyzk’s elaboration 
beyond these views resulted from navigating an untrodden topic in Orthodoxy: personhood. The 
idea of the self is not new to Orthodoxy. Orthodoxy, like most of Christianity, contends that the 
soul reaches restoration when it reunites with Christ. The soul defines humanity and connects it 
with God (along with the Incarnation). However, Kowalcyzk discusses personhood because of its 
importance in Roe v. Wade. Establishing the fetus’ personhood would guarantee its “right to life,” 
as Justice Harry Blackmun wrote in the case’s majority opinion.406 Therefore, Kowalcyzk explains 
personhood in Orthodox terms: 
For in sexual intercourse, it is not only the seeds of physical beings that are 
united, but also a soul. A father and mother not only transmit their physical 
characteristics, but they also transmit its soul. This sacred power man possesses of 
continuing God’s creation with Him is indeed a great wonder.407 
Sexual intercourse is not just the creation of a body; it is the transmission of a soul – the connection 
between God and humanity – to a fetus. Since the fetus has a soul, it has personhood and the right 
to life.  
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 Kowalczyk’s arguments has some interesting idiosyncrasies. The immateriality of the soul 
has been Eastern Orthodox dogma since the fourth century.408 Unlike Catholicism, the Orthodox 
Church had not decided when the soul enters the body when Kowalczyk published this pamphlet. 
On the other hand, the Catholic Church had adopted the Aristotelean idea of ensoulment for most 
of its history. According to Aristotle, the soul entered the body at the “quickening,” when the 
mother feels the fetus move for the first time. Before then, the fetus was “vegetative,” lacked a 
soul, and was not human. Because the fetus lacked a soul, abortion before quickening was not 
murder.409 However, this view changed as understandings of prenatal development challenged 
Aristotle, leading Pope Pius XI to label all abortion as murder in 1930.410 Kowalczyk adopted this 
contemporary Catholic position of ensoulment at conception in his argument for personhood when 
he argues that conception transmits the soul to the fetus.  
 Other OCA clergy seemed uninterested in this view; instead, they adopted ideas of prenatal 
development to argue against abortion. On May 8, 1973, St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary held 
seminars on “Contemporary ethics in America.”411 Interestingly, the speaker at the seminars was 
not an Orthodox clergyman; rather, it was Dr. Anthony Chila, the Chief of Staff at the Shenango 
Valley Osteopathic Hospital in Farrell Pennsylvania.412  Chila explained according to prenatal 
development, “Human life begins at the moment of conception.”413 In his commentary on the 
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seminars, Thomas Hopko that he agreed with Chila, finding that “human life is sacred and worthy 
of preservation . . . regardless of the stage of embryonic development.”414 
 Another idiosyncrasy in Kowalczyk’s argument is the importance of marriage. While 
discussing conception, he specifies that God transmits the soul to the fetus through marital sex.415 
His assertion raises a few questions: For example, does a fetus receive a soul if it is conceived 
through non-marital sex? Additionally, is abortion permissible if conception occurs from non-
marital sex? Kowalczyk’s hard line against any abortion suggests that he would reject these 
questions. Nonetheless, it is odd to specify conception from marital sex when he believes all 
abortion is unethical. Given his context, he was likely responding to the cultural and social changes 
of the 1960s. Sexual liberation made premarital sex more acceptable to a majority of the America 
public, breaking down the norms of marital sex.416 By presupposing marriage, Kowalczyk pushes 
back against changing cultural norms in multiple ways. He is reaffirming marital sex as the norm 
by not acknowledging premarital sex. He is also identifying marital sex as the only ethical form of 
sex since God ordains marriage.    
 Orthodox clergy other than Kowalczyk wrote about culture war issues; one of these priests 
was Kallistos Ware. Although Ware is not part of the OCA, he is a preeminent figure in Orthodoxy 
– assuming the role of Titular Metropolitan of the Ecumenical Throne in 2007.417 In 1986, Ware 
contributed to a collection of essays titled Personhood: Orthodox Christianity, the Connection 
between Body, Mind and Soul. In his essay “‘In the Image and Likeness’: The Uniqueness of the 
Human Person,” Ware argues that personhood comes from God because He creates humans in His 
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image.  Although our spirits will reunite with God after death, our physical bodies are important 
because they bear “God’s imprint and His seal.”418 Unlike Kowalczyk, Ware avoids the 
ensoulment argument. Instead, because God creates the body, humans have no right to destroy it. 
Whether the soul is in the body is irrelevant. Also unlike Protestants and Catholics who used 
prenatal development to argue against abortion, Ware rejected the influence of science when 
discussing personhood. He believed that theology had the necessary defense for personhood and 
avoided discussing bioethics.419 Furthermore, Ware never explicitly mentioned abortion. In this 
collection of Orthodox essays on personhood, only one author mentions abortion once in reference 
to abortion counseling.420 Nonetheless, Ware still engages in an argument important to the pro-life 
movement: that personhood derives from God’s creation of the individual. 
 Other clergy related to the OCA also indirectly addressed culture war issues. One of these 
clergymen was Thomas Hopko, future dean of St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary. In 1975, he 
published an article titled “On the Male Character of Christian Priesthood.” In it, Hopko defends 
Orthodoxy’s exclusion of women from its clergy. To do so, he argues that there is no spiritual 
difference between men and women.421 However, women have different means of realizing their 
spiritual truths. Men must “follow the perfect man, Christ” by emptying themselves of sin. Hopko 
acknowledges that this task is difficult, and he offers women as a solution. According to him, 
women should be “men’s helpers,” facilitating their “self-emptying” love and imitation of 
Christ.422 This complementarian view accomplishes more than denying women the priesthood. It 
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reinforces a tradition view of marriage: the subordination of the wife to her husband. In these 
respects, Hopko’s argument was similar to those presented by evangelicals. During the 1970s, 
evangelicals, particularly those in the Shepherding Movement, argued against the ordination of 
women by tying church structure to family hierarchy: God made men heads of the household; 
therefore, they should be heads of the church.423 In the end of the article, Hopko stresses the 
importance of following these gender relations. According to him, those who argue against them 
have “lost sight” of the original church.424 Hopko, like Ware, is another example of an Orthodox 
scholar connecting millennia-old ideas to contemporary issues – in this care gender roles and 
marriage.  
Another article in St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly addresses women and the 
priesthood. Like Hopko, the author defends the exclusion of women from the clergy. However, he 
has a different approach. The author rarely addresses the question of women in the priesthood; 
instead, he advocates for the domesticity of women. To support this view, he illustrates the 
“Hebrew model” of the family, with the mother as “protector” of the children, which the author 
notes includes “children-in-the-womb”. The world outside domestic life is, as the author bluntly 
puts, a “man’s world.”425 Although the author avoids explicitly discussing sexual liberations or 
contemporary challenges to gender roles and marriage, his article is truly about these issues. He 
disguises his argument for traditional gender roles in a discussion of women and the priesthood. 
He also ties in abortion, although he does not directly mention it, by emphasizing women as 
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protectors of the unborn. In these ways, this author, like Ware and Hopko, is indirectly engaging 
with culture war issues through theological debates.   
After examining these Orthodox clergy’s differing approaches to discussing culture war 
issues, the question remains: why did prominent voices in Orthodoxy such as Meyendorff and 
Hopko avoid explicitly engaging with culture war issues while Kowolczyk’s enthusiastically 
advocated for the pro-life cause? There are several potential reasons. First, sister churches were 
indifferent towards these issues. In 1992, when asked about abortion, Metropolitan Bartholomais 
responded with an evasive answer: Orthodoxy “generally speaking respects human life and the 
continuation of pregnancy,” but the Church also “respects the liberty and freedom of all human 
persons and all Christian couples.”426 Moreover, the churches that would adamantly advocate 
against abortion, such as the Russian Orthodox Church, were still under a Soviet government that 
permitted abortion.427 Meyendorff and other OCA leaders wanted to engage their Orthodox peers 
in scholarly debates; Alexander Schmemann had brought the St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary 
to the forefront of scholarly debates on liturgical theology. A metropolitan who “generally 
speaking” cares about abortion would not engage in impassioned debates on the pro-life cause. 
Discussing culture war issues would leave American Orthodoxy outside of mainstream Orthodox 
scholarship.  
Additionally, spreading Orthodoxy across the US was more important than culture war 
issues. After the NCC incident, the OCA recommitted to its ecumenical mission. Although it had 
doubts about the ability of ecumenical organizations to unite Christians under Orthodoxy, leaders 
such as Meyendorff reassured his peers, writing, the OCA has “nothing to fear if the Spirit is truly 
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present.”428 Another author wrote that the problem was not with ecumenism, but with the 
politicization of issues, which he believed lead to “false representations” of moral issues.429 
According to him, political issues would cloud the Church’s moral judgements and keep it from 
holy tradition. Lastly, a divisive issue like abortion would deter some Christians from Orthodoxy 
and cause divisions with other denominations as it did with the NCC – which was antithetical to 
Orthodoxy’s ecumenical goals.  
Nonetheless, although prominent voices in the OCA avoided discussing culture war issues 
directly, Orthodox pro-life activists connected their writings to the pro-life movement. Kowalczyk 
cited Thomas Hopko’s articles on medical ethics and sexuality to argue for God’s participation in 
procreation through marriage.430 The OCL’s guidebook recommended that members read books 
on medical ethics published by St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary Press, specifically Rev. John 
Breck’s The Sacred Gift of Life.431Although OCA clergy avoided directly discussing culture war 
issues, Orthodox pro-life activists saw their writings as support for social conservativism. 
Therefore, political actions aligned with their beliefs.  
Orthodox Christians and the Politics of Pro-Life Activism 
Although they were a small group, fully understanding how Orthodox Christians engaged with 
culture war issues also requires examining those who formed and joined activist organizations. 
Three members of the OCA founded the organization Orthodox Christians for Life (OCL) in 1986: 
Reverend Father Edward Pehanich, Reverend Deacon John Protopapas, and Matushka Valerie 
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Protopapas. A year later, it boasted twelve members at the March of Life rally. Although new 
members have revived the organization over the past few years, it went into hiatus in the early 
2000s after its founders pursued other projects and careers in the OCA.432 Nonetheless, the 
organization’s work in encouraging Orthodox participation in the March for Life rally and 
opposing Michael Dukakis’ presidential nomination reveal broader trends in social conservatism.  
Although there are few sources on OCL, the available ones demonstrate its propensity for 
working with other Christian groups. In 1988, OCL joined Catholics from the National Right to 
Life League at the March for Life, holding signs that read, “Stop killing babies” and “Stop the 
American Holocaust.”433 Four years later, OCL submitted an Amicus Curiae brief to the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the case Webster vs. Reproductive Health Services along with several other 
Christian denominations, including Baptists, Episcopalians, and Presbyterians.434  
When asked about why the OCL worked with non-Orthodox Christians, Pehanich 
explained that there were several reasons. According to him, it was primarily due to necessity. 
“Some of the higher level clergy gave somewhat mixed responses” to support for pro-life 
activism.435 He believes that their mixed responses made the Church’s position on abortion unclear 
and discouraged members from supporting the pro-life cause. If the OCL wanted to influence the 
movement, it needed to cooperate with other pro-life organizations. This approach was similar to 
other Christian conservative’s pro-life activism. Despite their theological differences across sects, 
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conservatives recognized the value of consolidating their efforts through interdenominational pro-
life organizations.436    
Although this is anecdotal evidence, it makes sense in the context of Orthodox history. As 
Schmemann argued in his discussions of ecumenism, the separation between politics and religion 
was alien to Orthodoxy.437 God endows the Orthodox with the correct understanding of the world, 
or “Orthodox vision,” which includes perspectives on social issues.438 This idea does not mean 
Orthodox Christians look to the Church for political opinions. Schmemann would argue that there 
are no issues separate from Orthodoxy. Furthermore, historically, the Orthodox had lived under 
regimes that permitted no political freedom and controlled the Church – such as the Russian Tsarist 
Regime.439 To Orthodoxy, issues like abortion were religious; when the West framed them 
politically, Orthodox Christians found themselves disconnected from political discourse.   
Additionally, OCA clergy were hesitant to frame religious issues politically. This anxiety 
was a continuation of Schmemann’s argument about Western influence on Orthodox thought. 
According to Schmemann, Western thought undermines Orthodoxy by removing religion from its 
logic – in other words, it is a secular way of thinking.440 One way that Orthodox clergy believed 
Western thought clouded Orthodoxy was through politicization, which one priest called the “false 
representations” of moral issues.441 Political issues would distract the Church from holy tradition 
as it tried to fit theology to political issues. As Schmemann believed, the Church was the source 
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of truth and it did not fit onto any Western ideas, including politics.442 Framing politics as the goal 
of theology would limit God’s truth to Western presumptions – preventing the Orthodox from 
having the “Orthodox vision.”  
Pehanich also emphasized the geography of Orthodoxy. Historically, Orthodox Christians 
have composed less than one percent of the US population and mostly live in Alaska, Chicago, 
Minneapolis, San Francisco or New York City – where Orthodox immigrants settled during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.443 Coordinating pro-life activities with local non-
Orthodox Christians was more efficient. To reach Orthodox Christians across the country, 
Pehanich and OCL circulated newsletters and pamphlets that educated readers about the pro-life 
cause.444  
However, perhaps the most important part of the OCL’s activism was the anxieties it 
expressed about how American society understood Orthodoxy. When Michael Dukakis became 
the Democratic Party Presidential Nominee in 1988, OCL members complained. One OCL 
member James George Jatras submitted a letter to Dukakis declaring him an “apostate to the faith” 
for his pro-choice position.445 The OCL also wrote a letter to Greek Archbishop Iakovos, urging 
him to “excommunicate Dukakis” due to “his non-Christian message.”446 Iakovos ignored the 
letter. Nonetheless, OCL members worried that Americans would equate pro-choice with 
Orthodoxy: “To preserve the integrity of our shared Orthodox faith we urge you [Iakovos] to avoid 
even the appearance of an endorsement of . . . Mr. Dukakis.”447 Additionally, OCL members 
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worried about interfaith marriage. In the letter, they also requested Dukakis’s excommunication 
because of his “non-Christian marriage.”448 
Since Dukakis’s wife is Jewish, critics of the OCL correctly labeled its members as anti-
Semitic. In an interview with the Washington Post, Valerie Protopapas said, since Iakovos refused 
to excommunicate Dukakis, “Now, every young women all over the country are coming to their 
[Orthodox] priests, saying they want to marry their Jewish boyfriends.”449 Besides anti-Semitism, 
Protopapas expressed anxieties typical of social conservatives during the late twentieth century. 
To her and other OCL members, pro-life activism represented more than opposing abortion; it 
meant fighting secularism and claiming influence for religion over society. Additionally, her 
problem with interfaith marriage reflected anxieties over the erasure of Orthodox identity as 
Orthodox Christians assimilated into America.   
Conclusion 
Orthodoxy’s position in the US’s religious landscape remained relatively similar to previous 
decades. As its leaders had done after World War II, the OCA maintained its ecumenical 
relationships in an attempt to enter America’s religious mainstream. As culture war issues 
complicated these connections, the OCA remained steadfast – emphasizing the power of 
Orthodoxy to convert outsiders once they realize its truth. Nonetheless, the OCA safeguarded itself 
as ecumenism failed to cause mass conversions or sway other denominations to Orthodoxy. 
Politicization of moral issues became the problem – a force that prevented other Christians from 
understanding Orthodoxy’s truths.  
                                                 




Despite the complications of ecumenism and politicized moral issues, the OCA and 
Orthodox clergy found ways to address the culture war. For higher-level clergy, they addressed 
these issues indirectly, usually guising them as theological discussions on other topics – such as 
the priesthood. For lower-level priests and laity who were less involved in the scholarly debates in 
higher Orthodox circles, culture war issues were more important. The lack of an official position 
from the OCA on culture war issues did not dissuade enthusiastic members from becoming 
activists – although it likely hindered the growth of their activism.  
The OCL and its members represented a small but important group of OCA members. 
Their activism echoed the efforts of non-Orthodox Christian conservatives. They wanted to claim 
authority for religion in public discourse. Additionally they worried about the effects of American 
society on Orthodoxy. With the nomination of Dukakis as the Democratic Presidential Candidate 
in 1988, OCL members feared that Americans would equate Dukakis’s liberal, pro-choice 












The story of Eastern Orthodox Christianity in North America and evangelism is complicated. The 
OCA has always held that it, like all Eastern Orthodox Churches, follows the true form Christian 
tradition and doctrine and possesses the authority of the apostles.   
 The OCA argues that theology motivated its declaration of autocephaly, but this is only 
part of the story. While fear of secular influence from the Soviet-controlled Russian Orthodox 
Church partially motivated their decision, the declaration came after the Soviets had loosened their 
grip over the Church. The declaration also came decades after the OCA began operating 
independently of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow, suggesting that autocephaly was more 
of a formal change – a recognition of the new status quo that had emerged from decades of isolation 
from the Mother Church. Furthermore, the Russian Orthodox Church had alienated the OCA 
through lawsuits and failed negotiations for rejoining the Russian North American diocese, 
illustrating that fear of Soviet influence from the Mother Church also motivated the decision. The 
pursuit of autocephaly is shocking because it broke with ecclesiastical order. One Church had 
never granted a diocese independence without the consent of an ecumenical council. Declaring 
autocephaly without the consent of other Eastern Orthodox Churches threatened to undermine the 
OCA’s authority.450 Despite the risk, the OCA said its autocephaly was legitimate – a debate that 
continues today.  
 Disconnected from the Russian Orthodox Church, the OCA entered a period of renewal. It 
published works in English, reconnecting second and third-generation immigrants to the Orthodox 
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Church.451 Orthodox clergy dislocated by World War II such as Alexander Schmemann and John 
Meyendorff immigrated to America. They assumed positions at St. Vladimir’s Theological 
Seminary, training new priests for American Orthodox Christians. Alexander Schmemann and his 
peers also brought Orthodoxy into dialogue with Orthodox institutions of the Old World and wrote 
scholarship that brought prestige to St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary. Schmemann’s liturgical 
theology reinvigorated church life by reemphasizing the fusion of liturgy, tradition, and worship. 
Additionally, Schmemann’s theology argued for “withdrawal in order to draw closer”; in other 
words, Orthodox missions meant demonstrating the true Christian lifestyle to lead the non-
Orthodox to convert.452 The revitalization of Orthodoxy coincided with renewed interests in 
ecumenism. Through ecumenism, Schmemann and Meyendorff believed non-Orthodox Christians 
would realize that the OCA exemplified true Christianity and convert.  
 Doubts as to whether ecumenism would lead the non-Orthodox to convert arose from the 
beginning of the OCA’s relationships with the WCC and NCC. However, doubts grew stronger 
during the culture wars of the late twentieth century. Unlike the culture wars of the 1920s, the 
OCA was stable. It was not in financial crisis; it had institutions, publications for clergy to discuss 
theological issues, and ecclesiastical order. The OCA could engage in public discourse instead of 
focusing on internal issues. As culture war issues arose, particularly around abortion, the OCA 
started seeing secularism as a domestic threat instead of one that laid behind the Iron Curtain. 
Allies in the NCC supported abortion – although Orthodox members met them with resistance.  
Despite the disagreements with the NCC, Meyendorff and Schmemann wanted to continuing 
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witnessing to the non-Orthodox through ecumenism. Ending memberships with ecumenical 
organizations would prevent this goal.   
The OCA maintained its ecumenical relationships as liberal Protestants adopted different 
positions on culture war issues. Schmemann and Meyendorff argued that Orthodoxy would 
surmount any secular challenge. However, as demonstrated by John Kowalczyk, Edward Pehanic, 
and John and Valerie, some Orthodox Christians also viewed social conservatism as a counter to 
secularism. In 1986, they formed the pro-life organization Orthodox Christians for Life (OCL). 
Although the organization was very small, it revealed how some Orthodox Christians fit into 
Western society even as they detested it as secular. They adopted the conservative evangelical 
view of activism: advancing Christian social ethics in the public sphere. They achieved this goal 
by uniting with Catholic pro-life organizations, specifically Birthright, despite theological 
differences with Catholicism.   
 An interesting theme within OCA history is its awareness of American views of 
Orthodoxy. These views became pertinent after the Russian Revolution, as fundamentalists and 
liberal Protestants idealized Russian Piety and outlined ways to evangelize Russian Orthodox 
Christians through missions. Although their discussions focused on Orthodox Christians in Russia, 
white Protestants revealed how they regarded the Orthodox as non-Christian. Nonetheless, they 
believed the Orthdoox would convert through the power of Scripture. Schmemann and his peers 
believed Western Christians had deviated from the faith; unlike white Protestants, Schmemann 
remained skeptical that Western Christians could understand Christianity because Western 
assumptions about religion were so different from Eastern ones. Additionally, OCL members were 
anxious about an Orthodox Christian being a presidential nominee. They disliked that he 
represented him and feared Americans would equate his values with theirs.    
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There is further research one could conduct on the OCA and its position in America’s 
religious landscape. For example, American Orthodox Christian laity have started participating in 
Orthodox discourse in new ways. One example is the Ancient Faith Ministries podcast. Although 
it is not associated with the OCA, the podcast often features OCA clergy as guest. One guest was 
Thomas Hopko, whose presence suggested that the OCA is open to reaching audiences through 
new platforms.453 Another example of Orthodox Christians participating in discourse is the 
YouTube channel of Jay Dyer. Dyer is an Orthodox Christian convert whose videos discuss topics 
ranging from Orthodox perspectives on marriage to mysticism. His channel also covers pop 
culture, such as Arnold Schwarzenegger and Star Trek, and controversial topics, such as 
creationism and evolution. 454 Despite the culture war content, his videos remain focused on 
Orthodoxy with his series called “Introduction to Orthodoxy,” where he explains Orthodox 
theology and history.455 Although Ancient Faith Ministries’ podcasts and Jay Dyer’s YouTube 
channel are different forms of media and content, exploring the OCA’s opinions of reaching 
audiences through new platforms would reveal how it views evangelism in the digital age. As a 
convert, they could view him as a Westerner who awes at Orthodox mysticism. Moreover, if the 
OCA hierarchy formally censured Dyer, one would find a boundary of the OCA’s outreach.  
Through the changing media landscape and American religious trends, Orthodoxy will 
cling to its ancient truths. Whether it will continue to evangelize and form relationships with non-
Orthodox Christians is a question that the OCA will always confront.  
                                                 
453 Ancient Faith Ministries, “Darwin and Christianity,” June 5, 2010, in Speaking the Truth in Love, produced by 
Ancient Faith Ministries, podcast, https://www.ancientfaith.com/podcasts/hopko/darwin_and_christianity_-
_part_11_death.  
454 Jay Dyer, “Jay Dyer Videos,” YouTube, accessed March 22, 2021, 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCnt7Iy8GlmdPwy_Tzyx93bA.  
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